Introduction: Resistance to Development-induced Displacement and Resettlement

Challenging the currently dominant neoliberal policies, voices articulating alternative approaches to development have appeared in the many regions of the world that have been forced to confront a wide variety of losses, costs and calamities brought about by development projects of many kinds. One of the voices increasingly heard today is that of people displaced and resettled by development projects. Uprooting and displacement have been among the central experiences of modernity. Development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR) is, in many ways, a clear expression of the ambitious engineering projects of a state with a monopoly on the management of force. Conversely, to be resettled is one of the most acute expressions of powerlessness because it constitutes a loss of control over one’s physical space. Indigenous peoples, the poor and other marginalised groups are increasingly choosing to resist DIDR in the hope that this will prove more effective in protecting their long-term interests than co-operation (Fisher 1999).

Uprooted people, and the social movements and organisations that have taken up their cause, are now at the forefront of an emerging transnational civil society (e.g. Fox and Brown 1998), which focuses on a broad spectrum of issues such as trade, democratisation, human rights, indigenous peoples, gender, security and the environment – often in opposition to the state and private capital (Khagram 1999). Development projects have increasingly become the contexts in which these interests and issues are contested and played out through different models of
development by local and nonlocal individuals and groups. Uprooted and resettled people have been joined by allies at national and international levels from communities of activists around the world, involving an extremely wide range of peoples, organisations, levels, contexts and relationships that call for greater democratisation and more participation of local populations in the decisions and projects affecting them.

This chapter seeks to explore the ways in which rights, claims and visions of the development process that are expressed in the complex and multidimensional forms of resistance to DIDR, become not only a means to refuse relocation or claim compensation or better conditions, but also help to initiate and become part of a multilevel, multisectoral effort to critique and reconceptualise the development process.

Development, as it has been generally and broadly conceived and applied, is the process through which the productive forces of economies and supporting infrastructures are improved through public and private investment. This can generally be subsumed into the two large-scale transformative trajectories of increased integration into the state and the market. Such processes do not occur without considerable cultural and social discontinuity and quite often conflict (Moore 1966, Wolf 1982). The discussion surrounding these necessary transformations has included a questioning that probes the democratic character of certain forms of development. Democratic regimes are said to be subject to pressures to allocate resources for consumption needs at the expense of investment for growth and development. The process of DIDR, when undertaken despite the opposition of affected peoples, or when accomplished without participation and benefits for affected peoples, calls into question the entire relationship between this form of development and democracy. Furthermore, the capacity of people to protest, resist and influence DIDR policy may constitute an important test of the democratic character of a particular regime.

Until quite recently, infrastructural and productive development have been considered to produce benefits that far outweigh any costs that such processes might entail. In many ways, any costs occasioned by infrastructural and productive development have been externalised, to be absorbed either by the environment or by the general population. DIDR resistance and other alternative forms of development discourse question the fundamental social, cultural and economic assumptions of development, and purport to offer alternative conceptualisations that produce benefits and reduce costs at specific local levels.

Since the end of the Second World War, there has been a relatively continuous spread and institutionalisation of global norms and principles of various types - regulatory, constitutive, practical and evaluative (Khagram 1999. 23). Three domains in particular: human rights; the environment; and the rights of indigenous peoples - all directly related to
DIDR – have seen particularly extensive growth and diffusion to many nations around the world (Khagram 1999: 25). The enormous challenges and problems faced by indigenous peoples around the world have given rise to literally thousands of national and international organisations, particularly in the post-Second World War period of decolonisation (Gray 1996: 113). Consequently, it is in this broader context of an emerging transnational civil society addressing development from the perspective of human rights, the environment and the rights of indigenous peoples that the people and organisations resisting DIDR act.

Resettlement studies have focused largely on dams in particular because of their widespread social and environmental impacts as well as their powerful expression of the Western, technologically driven form of development. The most detailed analyses of resistance movements focus on those confronting dam-related DIDR in India and Southeast Asia (Fisher 1995, McCully 1996, Parasuraman 1999) and in Latin America (Bartolomé and Barabas 1990, McCully 1996, Rothman and Oliver 1999). Other forms of DIDR (conservation, tourism development, urban renewal, mining, transportation, pipelines, etc.) and resistance to them have received less attention, although urban renewal in the developed world has been closely examined since the 1950s (Gans 1962, Fried 1963, Smith, N. 1996). Recently, conservation driven resettlement has received considerable attention (Brechin et al. 2003), but more analysis of resistance is still needed (Escalad and Da Silva 2000). Privately funded DIDR development projects are increasing and the resistance movements that confront them face new and different challenges. The significance of such research will thus only increase in the coming decade.

Disclosure of movement formation, leadership and strategising carries with it the potential of compromising specific individuals, as well as of providing information useful in co-opting, pre-empting or disarming DIDR resistance movements. The danger of such disclosures should always be framed in the context of the importance of disseminating the important information and perspectives necessary for the improvement of development policy and practice that DIDR resistance movements seek to achieve. Resistance brings into high relief the serious defects and shortcomings in policy frameworks, legal options, assessment and evaluation methodologies, and lack of expertise in implementation that plague much of the development effort. However, the question of how we can explain movements without compromising them remains difficult and should be at the forefront of research concerns.

The perception that many of the most vulnerable are forced to share an unfair burden of the costs of development, and that this constitutes a violation of basic human and environmental rights, is the core substance of resistance. In that sense, this chapter, rather than being a simple inventory of causes, forms and contexts of DIDR resistance, aims to address the
cultural politics of resettlement policy and practice as constructed by its various participants. It is not accepted as given that development that displaces people is both necessary and inevitable. The chapter does, however, assert the fundamentally political nature of decisions to undertake such projects as result in displacement and resettlement. In addressing the politics of DIDR and resistance to it, the chapter itself cannot be seen as separate from the discourse that has emerged surrounding the core issues.

The Problematics and Politics of DIDR Resistance

As a citizen of the nation one has the right to development through its institutions, and one’s rights include participation in the decision-making processes that impact one’s life and community. At a fundamental level, DIDR resistance is a discourse about rights. DIDR pits the rights of the state (and, increasingly, of private capital) to develop against the rights of specific peoples targeted for resettlement. Although the rhetoric that accompanies large-scale development projects frequently makes references to national purpose and proposes benefits for a general public, those who must suffer the costs that these projects entail tend to be quite specific communities. It is fundamentally the failure of the state and, increasingly, the private sector to undertake these projects in an ethical and competent fashion that produces conditions that generate major forms of resistance. Human rights groups have challenged the idea that development policy decisions arrived at through techno-managerial forms of cost-benefit analysis should set priorities, rather than other standards of judgment such as distributive justice, the right to adequate livelihood or the right to human dignity (Colchester 1999: 13). The distinction between development defined in terms of economic growth as opposed to development defined in terms of the expansion of social, economic and political rights and power to broader sectors of the population lies at the core of DIDR resistance.

The increasing involvement of private capital shifts the goal of projects from improving social and economic conditions to enhancing the reproduction of capital in the form of profit, which is also considered to enhance the well-being of the society. Generally, people displaced by private development are considered to be voluntary migrants, having accepted a sum of money in exchange for their land. Market transactions have the effect of disguising the difference between voluntary migration and forced displacement. Many factors may influence such a decision to accept payment or other forms of compensation for land, some of which, in both public and privately driven displacement, amount to various forms of coercion. Resistance movements call into question the voluntary nature of much of this ‘voluntary’ displacement.
Resistance involves a continuum of forms, ranging from passive foot-dragging, nonappearance at official sites and times, inability to understand instructions and other ‘weapons of the weak’ so ably described by Scott (1985), to protest meetings, civil disobedience, outright rebellion and warfare. The lack of overt resistance does not indicate that displacement is voluntary. By the same token, there are instances in which active resistance does not always indicate a primary agenda of reluctance to relocate. In these instances, resistance becomes a tool of negotiation to increase the levels of compensation.

**DIDR Resistance: Diversity, Complexity and Dynamism**

A significant percentage of those who face removal, whatever the cause, frequently come from the most disadvantaged and marginalised sectors of society, ranging from tribal groups to peasants to inhabitants of regional towns and large cities. The communities that face displacement are themselves internally diverse, often along class, ethnic and religious lines. Resistance to resettlement is, however, not limited to people whose lives are directly affected by projects. Local, regional, national and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and social movements with a wide variety of missions and agendas have joined and assisted in the struggle of peoples around the world to resist DIDR.

The responses and motivations for acceptance or resistance are complex and diverse, ranging from purely material considerations to the most deeply felt ideological beliefs and concerns (Oliver-Smith 1996). Equally as diverse, protests and resistance to resettlement by development projects and practices have taken many forms and expressions. Such actions take place in villages and towns, at project sites, in state and national capitals, at the offices of multilateral institutions and international organisations, in cyberspace and at conferences and seminars in schools and universities around the world. Resistance to DIDR also produces a complex array of purposes and initiatives blending environmental, social, cultural and economic concerns that may focus on resisting specific issues or general models of development.

Resistance to DIDR is also extremely dynamic, both changing with conditions itself and also influencing those individuals, groups and institutions with which it intersects. DIDR resistance may provoke changes in resettlement policy and practice, and ultimately a re-framing of fundamental questions in development. Communities and organisations in resistance evolve in response to national governments and multilateral agencies and, in turn, oblige such bodies to evolve themselves.
Organisational Forms in DIDR Resistance

Resistance to DIDR in its most contemporary forms must be seen as taking place in an era in which an extraordinary growth of organised social action of a wide variety of identities and forms has occurred. This expansion of activism has in part been a response by people to needs or challenges not met or presented by government and has unquestionably been facilitated by greater access to both transport and communications technology. Resistance to resettlement in its contemporary forms is one aspect of an increasing grassroots activism in collaboration with nonlocal allies around the world. Generally these connections across levels of the social scale enable local resistance groups to access assistance in the form of financial resources, media campaigns, political pressure or other forms of aid. One of the key challenges facing these interconnected organisations is articulating a coherent and consistent set of interests across such diverse constituencies.

Resistance to development-induced resettlement in most cases takes place in the form of organised collective action of people in communities and/or in groups, both locally and extra-locally. Such organised activities are manifested in four major forms, which have played important roles in the various forms of expression that resistance to resettlement has taken. These forms are: social movements; NGOs; grassroots organisations (GROs); and transnational networks.

Social movements have become a particularly important form of collective action for people to engage in to promote or resist change, as these movements act in pursuit of common interests or values to which such people strongly adhere (McAdam et al. 1988). The political goals of social movements are expressed as claims to rights or to the extension and exercise of rights. This language of rights provides the means to organise the elements of social struggle and has found broad application, providing a form of ‘master frame’ for social mobilisation (Foweraker 2001: 4). Since, in the modern era, the power to grant or withhold rights is vested primarily in the state, social movements make demands on the state.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which are not generally social movements, but may become allies or parts of social movements, have become an integral feature of contemporary development policy and practice. NGOs take on different roles in resettlement work. Some NGOs work for the entity promoting the development project in the planning of resettlement communities. Others work to improve the conditions of those communities that have accepted resettlement, or have already been resettled, such as Arch Vahini in the context of the Sardar Sarovar dam project in India (Dwivedi 1998: 150). Yet others, such as the International Rivers Network, work to assist those communities that have chosen to resist resettlement, providing information, media assistance, organisa-
tional capacity, networking and financial resources (Williams 1997). The expansion of the number of NGOs working in DIDR resistance is largely among those devoted to environmental and human rights issues.

Grass-roots organisations (GROs) are membership organisations dedicated to the improvement of their own communities, and often have deep social and cultural roots, evolving from traditional local organisations. In the last three decades, tens of thousands of such groups across the world have emerged in response to worsening social conditions (Fisher 1996: 60). The increasing availability of outside support from national and international NGOs and social movements has also supported the growth of local organisations. The spread of computers has made it possible for local organisations to communicate what they have learned with each other throughout nations and across borders and oceans. Thus, DIDR-affected people around the world can now share knowledge gained in land and resource disputes with provincial and national governments over the Internet and on their websites. In some cases, such as the MAB (Dam Victims Movement) in Brazil, these networks coalesce and form NGOs, national social movements (McDonald 1993, Rothman and Oliver 1999) or transnational networks.

Transnational networks, the most recent DIDR resistance organisational form to emerge, are composed of dynamic, multiple, reticulated transnational linkages. The term 'reticulated' is key here. Facilitated by the rapid expansion of information technology, networks include individuals, NGOs, GROs and social movements, and often blur the distinctions between the subnational, international and transnational (Kumar 1996: 42). Networks are most easily formed on the Internet and when they cluster around political issues; politics, in effect, acquires a new theatre (Kumar 1996).

Two different kinds of activists stand out in their participation in networks. First, networks draw upon a community of scholars and experts who employ the scientific and technical knowledge base to broaden the existing discourse on particular problems. Second, networks depend on grass-roots activists, often members of social movements, NGOs or GROs, who usually take more challenging stands on issues and confront power-holders more directly (Kumar 1996: 32). These two groups definitely overlap, with members from each taking on the roles and functions of the other.

A Political-ecological Approach to DIDR Resistance

In the sense that DIDR resistance involves conflicts over complex relationships, involving sets of rights and risks that people have within a physical environment, this analysis falls under the rubric of political ecology. Political ecology largely focuses on the conflicts that emerge over
rights to access, ownership and disposition of resources and environments, for which different social groups, often characterised by widely differing sociocultural identities and economic adaptational forms, contend. In DIDR resistance, although the stakes may be expressed in economic, social and/or cultural terms, the fundamental issue is the political contestation over rights to a place or the resources of a place.

Within the framework of political ecology, the core concepts of vulnerability and risk offer a means to identify and analyse the participants, scales and action levels, as well as the strategies and goal structures of DIDR resistance. Vulnerability and risk refer to the relationships among people, the environment and the sociopolitical structures that frame the conditions in which people live. The concept of vulnerability thus integrates political, economic and environmental forces, in terms of both biophysical and socially constructed risk. This understanding of vulnerability has enabled researchers to conceptualise how social systems generate the conditions that place different kinds of people, often differentiated along axes of class, race, ethnicity, gender or age, at different levels of risk (Giddens 1990, Beck 1992, 1995). Among these conditions, development policy and practice must be considered as generating and distributing risk and vulnerability differentially.

People facing DIDR suffer from uncertainty, and a lack of appropriate information seriously hampers their ability to assess conditions and act. Recently, Dwivedi has asserted that uncertainty and a lack of predictability heighten the perception of risk because, without adequate information, no calculations of losses and benefits are possible (1999: 47). Most mandated resettlement projects deprive people of control and generally do not provide accurate information with which people can reassert satisfactory control over and understanding of the resettlement process. The often extremely negative concrete impacts of resettlement projects on affected peoples compound the disorientation generated by the loss of control and understanding as motivations for resistance. Resistance is a reassertion of both a logic and a sense of control (Oliver-Smith 1996).

Mediating institutions, such as NGOs, also frame and may politicise uncertainties and risks and may be pivotal in the way people construct risk as well. Dwivedi asserts that when people feel that the risks associated with displacement and resettlement exceed cultural norms of what is acceptable, or when compensation is deemed inadequate, resistance will be forthcoming. Dwivedi's approach permits a disaggregation of populations facing DIDR according to the differential risks they perceive and their likelihood of resisting on the basis of those perceptions. The approach also disaggregates risk into project performance risks in terms of costs and benefits, financial risks in terms of adequate funds for implementation, environmental risks, such as reservoir-induced seismicity,
insect plagues or waterborne diseases, and distributional risks in which benefits, for example, are captured by the rich (Dwivedi 1999: 45).

The World Commission on Dams (WCD) links risk with the concept of rights in advocating that an ‘approach based on “recognition of rights” and “assessment of risks” (particularly rights at risk)’ be elaborated to guide future planning and decision-making on dams (2000: 206). In terms of risk analysis, the contribution of the WCD global review lies in distinguishing between risk takers and risk bearers, or the voluntary and involuntary assumption of risk. By combining the consideration of rights and risks, the inadequacies and simplifications of traditional cost-benefit analysis can be avoided and better planning and decision-making can result, based on the complexity of the considerations involved and the values that societies place on different options (WCD 2000: 206). The importance of a rights and risks approach to DIDR is that it allows for the inclusion not just of material concerns, but also of the issues relating to the symbolic and affective domains. As such, it provides not only an approach to improving planning and decision-making for dam projects, but also the template for an approach to understanding and analysing resistance to DIDR in general. Littie (1999) has suggested that such a template can be activated by at least one of three methodological and strategic orientations.

An advocacy anthropology approach is characterised by an activist stance that privileges a particular group’s perspective over competing or contesting positions. Littie (1999) suggests that one limitation of an advocacy approach is that only one point of view of the many that may be present in resettlement issues is presented. Conversely, it can equally be argued that advocacy anthropology often articulates a view that otherwise might not be heard, thus promoting dialogue and negotiation.

Stakeholder analysis employs methods of conciliation, negotiation and mediation for reducing levels of conflict and managing disputes. Such efforts at establishing truly effective methods for crosscultural negotiation in DIDR could play meaningful roles in enhancing the capacity of local peoples to represent their interests effectively. On the other hand, stakeholder analysis frequently assumes that all actors have equal or symmetrical stakes in the conflict. Moreover, stakeholder approaches also assume that all participants in a dispute hold and have the abilities to employ the rights of citizenship within the larger political space of the nation. Assumptions of this sort are far from warranted, especially in the case of ethnic minorities or indigenous peoples (Littie 1999).

Political ecology ethnography, by focusing on environmental conflicts, generates a social scientific approach that incorporates multiple perspectives and that has the potential, not only to put the political dimensions of these conflicts, but also to bring new participants into the political frame of action and to initiate new approaches to viewing power relationships across multiple social and natural scales (Littie 1999: 4).
Importantly, this approach has the potential to create concepts that may be adopted by the new participants in order to question established public policy and to generate new alternatives for action. Most essentially, it is able to reveal the basic claims to resources and territory that are made by participant social actors, and to analyse the forms by which such claims are promoted and defended within broader political spheres, such that the competing discourses of cultural and political legitimacy are displayed (Little 1999: 5). Although Little (1999) presents these strategies as mutually separate and exclusive, all three approaches can be implemented according to context without necessary contradiction. Advocacy anthropology is appropriate for work at the level of the community to be resettled. Researchers adopting an advocacy stance fulfill a necessary function in assisting communities in their efforts to deal with the crisis facing them and in articulating their views in nonlocal contexts. Enlightened stakeholder analysis can reveal the differentials in value positions that are being negotiated among very disparate participants. Stakeholder analysis that is culturally sensitive can frame the issues in ways that help to balance those situations where there are significant differences in culture, negotiating experience, and bargaining power (as one historian put it, one party has 'a continent to exchange and the other, glass beads'). A political ecology ethnography of resistance helps to place resistance in the context of global conversations about development. The political ecological perspective reveals the commonalities that local resistance movements share with similar struggles elsewhere, contributing to the emergence of new forms of discourse in the shaping of alternative approaches to development that are less destructive to environments and human rights.

Who Resists? The Social Dimensions of DIDR Resistance

Identifying resistors basically involves specifying the interests and identities of those affected peoples who feel that their rights have been infringed upon and who feel that they are being forced to suffer unacceptable risks. Responses will also vary over time as the project and the struggle against it evolve, each in response to the other. Responses also vary because not everyone in a community, much less a region, will be affected in the same way at the same time by either resettlement or the environmental alterations that the project will enact.

A variety of factors has proven to be significant in the development of DIDR resistance movements, including the social identity of individuals and the identity and organisation of groups within the impacted population. Further, political variables, economic factors and cultural issues may influence who participates in resistance movements. Neither rural com-
munities nor urban neighbourhoods are ever entirely homogeneous. Thus, the degree of internal diversity, patterns of conflict and consensus, and social, racial, ethnic and class factors in an affected population will all play an important role in the development of, and the participation of local people in, DIDR resistance movements. Within even small communities, some will resist while others may simply acquiesce and still others will willingly accept resettlement. Such differences in response to both resettlement and resistance may have longer-term implications for the social organisation of a community threatened or affected by DIDR.

Internal differentiation, a multifaceted relationship to the immediate environment and the state, the availability of local and nonlocal allies and the quality of the resettlement process itself are crucial factors in assessing why people resist DIDR (Oliver-Smith 1991, 1994). Dwivedi contends that those who resist usually come from the sectors of the affected populations who perceive that they are placed at greatest risk by the prospect of displacement, the resettlement plan and/or its implementation. He asserts that risks are perceived differentially by men, women, the young, the elderly, rich farmers, landless labourers, indigenous peoples, peasants, outcast groups and other minorities (Dwivedi 1997, 1998, 1999). Resettlement projects evolve over time in interaction with mediating action groups and policy adjustments, both of which have the potential of changing both the perception of risk and the decision-making frameworks of people facing and/or resisting resettlement. The resistance dynamic thus emerges as a 'dialectic' among: the people to be resettled; action group intervention; and policy and project authorities.

The need to organise for resistance will exert a new form of pressure on the internal workings of a community. The organisation of a resistance movement may sharpen both internal and external pre-existing conflicts. Patterns of internal differentiation may inhibit the formation of necessary levels of solidarity and co-operation for effective resistance. Governments and project authorities may attempt to exploit or even create internal divisions within communities to reduce their capacity to organise and negotiate (Parasuraman 1999: 244). In some cases, the threat of resettlement creates a culture of solidarity far more intense than that which had existed prior to the project (Rapp 2000). Resistance requires the intensification of relationships with traditional allies, as well as the development of new relationships with others, often completely foreign to the local context (Magee 1989).

Particular groups may find their interests furthered by certain features of a resettlement project, while other groups will see themselves as suffering great disadvantage. Differential costs and benefits from resettlement projects may vary according to land and labour factor markets, social differentiation, or other local features, predisposing some groups to favour resettlement and others to oppose it. Communities threatened
with resettlement cannot be assumed to be homogeneous. In resistance movements all players have specific agendas that they attempt to further.

Much resistance must be seen as a result of the exclusion of affected communities from participation in the planning and decision-making processes of DIDR. The goal of participation is consistent with the emphasis on the recognition and restoration of the rights of affected peoples. Participation is a particularly thorny issue in many cases because, if authentic participation is achieved, it tends to violate many, if not all, of the traditional forms of power relations and social interaction in most societies. Those affected tend to be members of subaltern groups who are generally not considered by elites to have the social and cultural tools necessary for executive, or even advisory, forms of decision-making, planning and execution that pertain to development projects (Parasuraman 1999).

Most resettlement programmes become extremely large bureaucratic and technical organisations operating with specific models of development and progress. Project goals customarily emphasise meeting practical (i.e. material) rather than strategic needs, instrumentality rather than empowerment (Cleaver 1999: 598). The goals of development/resettlement programmes generally emphasise the creation of formalised community organisations that interface well with national bureaucratic structures. Such programmes aim in many ways to remake the community along lines that are compatible with the larger system (Cleaver 1999: 602).

A persistent tension arises from the degree to which grass-roots opinions are consulted and their participation factored into decisions taken at higher levels in the struggle. The articulation and participation of all the diverse interests of extremely heterogeneous populations, in a way that is still coherent with all the organisational agendas regarding approaches to development, is a major challenge for NGOs assisting communities facing DIDR.

One of the principal points of contention in DIDR resistance involves the categories, established by project planners, of people to be included as recipients of resettlement assistance. These categories bring with them bundles of rights that are attached to material and social benefits or costs (Rapp 2000). Consequently, many struggles are undertaken by local groups and their NGO allies to resist exclusion by category from resettlement benefits or compensation – struggles which have also been the source of internal disputes and conflicts. For example, the category of formally titled landholder becomes particularly thorny when indigenous groups hold traditional use rights of land, but no formally recognised titles.

The cultural significance of indigenous identity has also been heightened for both holders and nonholders of that identity by development projects. Kinship categories and distance, often crucial in determining indigenous identity, have also proved to be important in determining entitlement and distribution of resettlement benefits (Dwivedi 1998). The lack of recognition of larger regional environmental impacts of projects
has also led to the exclusion of people whose access to resources essential for livelihood is seriously affected by projects, e.g. populations living downstream from dams. A great deal of protest and resistance is organised around the failure to include the downstream populations structurally displaced by dam-induced environmental damage (Magee 1989, Dwivedi 1999).

When a community decides to resist a DIDR project, that decision engages it with a process which, even if successful, entails significant changes for that community, both internally and externally. The threat of resettlement constitutes a crisis of enormous proportions for many communities. Crises are periods of time when customary practices of daily life are suspended and new possibilities of action, alliances and values are created (Fantasia 1988: 14).

Protest and resistance may encompass critiques of project implementation, state development programmes and strategies, and the general global political economy of development. This diversity of idioms and meanings is seen as essential for resistance movements to articulate support at different levels and in different contexts. While consistently based on a foundational concept of the defense of human and civil rights, individuals and groups resisting DIDR construct a number of fundamental themes from which they develop a wide variety of discourses, images, symbols and representations for the various allies and opponents they encounter at various levels. Depending on the characteristics of the project, the social and environmental context in which it is located and the risks and losses that affected people will be or are suffering, some themes may be emphasised over others. The major themes through which the various discourses are developed include: environment, economics, culture, project risks, governance and administration, approaches to development, and justice and human rights.

Environmental Upheaval and Resistance

Resistance is a rejection of an attempt by certain interests to transform an environment in some way that requires the displacement of people. As such, environmentally related conflict is at the centre of grass-roots and NGO resistance to DIDR. Both the state and private interests, in undertaking large-scale infrastructure development and conservation projects, base their decisions on culturally particular constructions of the environment.

For most of the twentieth century, nature and society were seen as distinct, in opposition to one another. This ideological construction focuses on the domination and control of nature by society. Now, as then, certain people get relegated into the 'nature' category as the need arises, and frequently become the objects of development strategies and projects.
Indeed, a frequent subtext of development projects is the acculturation of such people to majority-held culture by obligatory participation, whether through forced displacement and resettlement or through some other activity. In effect, the goal of such projects is often to 'socialise' these 'natural' people and bring them into the national fold.

In the West, nature has been constructed as a fund of resources which human beings have not only a right to tap into, but also a right to alter and otherwise dominate in any way they deem fit. The enlightenment ideals of human emancipation and self-realisation (read 'development') have been closely linked to the idea of the control and use of nature (Harvey 1996: 121-22). The 'plasticity myth', as Murphy has termed it, is based on the idea that the relationship between humans and their environments can be reconstructed at will by the application of human reason (Murphy 1994).

Confronting these images and accompanying norms for action towards nature are innumerable alternative constructions of nature held by the enormous variety of peoples around the world. Many local cultures do not accept the dichotomy between nature and society that has undergirded Western economic positions regarding nature, but rather posit a continuity between the biophysical, human and supernatural worlds, that is established through ritual and symbol and is embedded in social relations. In general, local models of nature are complexes of meanings – usages that cannot be rendered intelligible through modern constructions nor understood without some reference to local culture and place (Escobar 2001: 151).

Perhaps no other instance so epitomises the subjugation of disorderly nature to human rationality as the 'taming' of rivers by channelling and dam construction. The environmental consequences of large dam construction have been the focus of intense campaigns of opposition by environmental groups for several decades. The environmental destruction created by dams has deep spiritual repercussions for many peoples whose religions are based on the close relationship between the natural and supernatural worlds. Although the anti-dam movement essentially began as an environmental movement, it quickly found common cause with human rights activists who quite correctly realised that all the negative environmental impacts were experienced first, and most directly, by local people.

In 1980 the International Union for the Conservation of Nature published the World Conservation Strategy, challenging the national park model and advocating the incorporation of local people into the conservation process. The World Bank followed this initiative with a programme called Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDP), intended to integrate local people into projects to enable them to benefit economically. However, more recently, dissatisfaction with the outcomes of such projects has generated a more exclusionary strain within the conservation movement, recently dubbed the 'protectionist paradigm' (Brechin
et al. 2003). It calls for a radical transformation of nature, namely the removal of all human inhabitants from environments deemed endangered (Oates 1999, Terborgh 1999). This strategy entails the forced removal of people from their homelands, producing another variety of environmental refugee (Albert 1992, Geisler and Da Sousa 2001). Barring outright displacement, the ‘new protectionist paradigm’ advocates radically restricting resource-use practices employed by people resident in reserves and parks. Such restrictions constitute a form of structural displacement in that, while people have not been geographically moved, the norms and practices with which they have engaged the environment in the process of social reproduction have become so altered as to effectively change their environment from one that is known to one that must be freshly encountered with new norms and new practices if social reproduction is to continue.

Economic Debates: Evaluating Risks and Compensating Losses

If the decisions to displace and resettle people are fundamentally political, the purposes of development projects that displace people are most often economic. In economic terms, DIDR resistance involves a conflict between the needs of a local society and the needs of a regional or national one. Between a project that is justified on purely economic grounds and a community’s multifaceted existence, there is a fundamental analytical disjuncture. The data, rationale and basis for projects are generally unidimensionally quantitative and economic. Economic planners and their methods and tools cannot address the multidimensionality that is presented by DIDR. Characteristically, that which economics cannot address is dismissed as external to the problem, statistically insignificant or unimportant. This idea of multidimensionality, so fundamental to any clear understanding of resettlement, is therefore rarely factored into the planning process of projects that will displace people (Cernea 1999: 21, 23), and this inevitably provides the rationale for resistance. The motivation and justification for projects is fundamentally economic, and the nature of the decisions that have been made and the plans that have been drawn up come from a perspective that in most cases has markedly different value orientations and rationalities from those of the people to be displaced, and are almost inevitably going to provoke resistance.

Many of the core disputes fuelling resistance movements are thus economic in nature. There is a close linking of the idea of economic quantification with rationality and science, allegedly allowing for precision and banishing the ambiguity that plagues decision-making in political discourse (Espeland 1999). The means by which such a position is derived is
a calculus known as cost-benefit analysis (CBA), which provides policy makers and politicians with a method for making decisions that is purportedly objective, fair and democratic, with the decisions and outcomes being arrived at scientifically. If the value of the benefits outweighs the value of the costs, an objective basis for proceeding with a project is deemed to have been provided to the policy maker. For CBA to be carried out, the costs and benefits in all their diversity have to be conveniently expressed in some uniform, quantitative format, preferably in money prices. Money values or prices are usually arrived at by the modified or unmodified intersection of supply and demand in a marketplace. Using prices thus presents a problem for arriving at the price of costs and benefits from a project that are not the result of the intersection of supply and demand in a market.

Therefore, a method must be devised to access how people would monetarily value nonmarket items. In ‘contingent valuation’, people are asked how much they would be ‘willing to pay’ (WTP) for the things the analyst is seeking to value if they were for sale (Adams 1996: 2). WTP works best when people are asked about benefits. However, in cases of DIDR, the question for people who are being impacted is more frequently one of costs. In the case of costs, the question then revolves around how much money a person would be willing to pay to prevent losses or ‘willing to accept’ (WTA) as compensation for losses. These questions are not simply inversions of each other. They elicit manifestly different responses. On the one hand, asking a person how much they would be willing to pay to prevent a loss is constrained by that person’s ability to pay. On the other hand, asking a person how much they would be willing to accept as compensation for a loss elicits what economists have characterised as ‘unrealistically high answers’ (Adams 1996). WTP is generally preferred, for reasons of sound economy.

As Cernea points out, CBA justifies a project economically on the basis of benefits that are greater than costs in terms of total sums. However, it does not account for the distribution of either costs or benefits. It cannot ask who pays the costs, suffers the losses or reaps the benefits. Moreover, CBA establishes aggregate costs and benefits when it is individuals who incur the costs and absorb the losses (Cernea 1999: 20). It is also inadequate for assessing costs that are real, but difficult to quantify, such as the losses experienced in the breakdown of community or the loss of cultural or spiritual resources. Other critics of CBA (Adams 1996, Espeland 1998, O’Neill 1999) contend that it distorts the values that people attach to both natural and cultural resources.

One of the main points of dispute in DIDR resistance is the appropriate means to measure or account for costs and losses of natural resources. As a feature of the natural environment, land, however altered or enhanced it may be, is here considered a natural resource. Market value for land in the
home context may be greater than the market value of land in the region
of resettlement, due to both availability and quality. Hence, many people
engage in protest and resistance activities to mitigate for the use of replace-
ment value as the standard for compensation in the case of land.

However, rights in property are rarely completely clear-cut. In many
contexts in which D-IDR has taken place, formal titles to land are more the
exception than the rule. People may depend on resources that exist on
land that is considered to be either government or common property.
Thus, when people are displaced, the issue of whom to compensate as
well as how to compensate is central in the demands resistance move-
ments put forth. The pressure by resistance movements for the recogni-
tion of other forms of tenure and ownership has in recent years led to a
modification of the position taken by many projects in this regard.
Further, a great deal of pressure has been mounted to mitigate for com-
ensation for other kinds of natural resources such as water and forests.

From an economic standpoint, the basic motivation for resistance lies
squarely in the fact that resettlement projects consistently impoverish
people (Koenig 2001). A simplistic approach towards this issue is largely
responsible for much of the economic injustice, impoverishment and
resistance that D-IDR projects generate. The loss of access to resources that
are fundamental to the maintenance of life, whether in the rural or urban
context, can provide the basis for mobilisation of resistance. People are
generally not compensated for less tangible assets than land such as
access to markets, communal property resources or social networks
(Fisher 1995: 32). In urban contexts, a key issue is loss of accessibility to
employment. Slum clearance and urban renewal have frequently left
resettled people far from sources and sites of employment, and often dis-
tant from regular transportation routes and facilities (Perlman 1982). Such
losses may be actively resisted because they impoverish people in diverse
ways. The shift to a monetised economy from a use-value, reciprocity-
based economy has rarely been smooth (Moore 1966), but when those
profound cultural changes are coupled with the threat and/or trauma of
resettlement, then social disarticulation, cultural disintegration and resist-
ance become more likely.

Cultural resources become particularly problematic to CBA; in order to
work, the requirements of CBA oblige a form of commodification of
everything. What is the consequence of asking someone what he or she
would be willing to pay to prevent the inundation of the burial grounds
of their ancestors? The outrage that frequently results from such a query
represents an intractable problem known as 'constitutive incommensura-
tibility', which increasingly confronts the discourse of CBA (O'Neill 1999).
Constitutive incommensurability refers to an unresolvable plurality of
values. That is, there are some objects, places, conditions or states of
affairs that resist being reduced to a single, uniform measure. They are
essentially constituted by particular kinds of shared understandings that are incompatible with market relations on moral or ethical grounds. Appropriate forms and levels of compensation clearly cannot be arrived at by outsiders employing some ostensibly 'objective' method such as CBA, but only in consultation with the affected people (Fisher 1995: 32).

Recent work carried out for the World Commission on Dams points to the overwhelming need for reparations for people displaced by dam construction whose losses have never been appropriately compensated (Johnston 2000). The 1994 Manibeli Declaration also called on the World Bank to establish a fund to provide reparations to the people displaced by bank-funded dams, arguing that the fund should be managed by an independent, transparent and accountable institution and should include training and assistance for affected communities in the preparation of claims. This demand was reiterated at the first international meeting of dam-affected people in Curitiba, Brazil in 1997. Resistance and opposition movements have made payment of reparations to dam-affected peoples a central issue in their campaigns. Dam reparations call for a variety of remedies, including monetary and such nonmonetary measures as dam decommissioning, official recognition of injustices committed and the restoration of ecosystems (International Rivers Network 2003a).

Some private-sector interests, such as the Rio Tinto Corporation, have developed resettlement policies and attempt to work with the affected people to implement them. Nevertheless, most private-sector development relies on the market mechanism to assess adequate compensation for people displaced by such development. The market mechanism provides the appearance of voluntary relocation by participants. Indeed, private-sector driven DIDR, often involving large numbers of people, frequently simply passes as 'unrecognised' (Appa and Patel 1996). In rural contexts, private-sector expansion, particularly in the developing world, has often adopted informal and even violent methods of expulsion.

The expansion of the private-sector tourist economy has seen the displacement of many traditional residents as well. Private-sector tourism development, often with the complicity of governments, threatens communities around the world. Golf course development in Asia has evoked widespread resistance from threatened communities in several nations seeking to stimulate economic growth through tourism (Ling and Ferrari 1995, Pleumaram 1994, Schradie and De Vries 2000).

**Cultural Discourses of Resistance**

Although the reasons people resist DIDR are often assumed to be economic in nature, the concerns that people express in resistance movements are generally more complex, embracing economic, social and, par-
particularly, cultural issues. Indeed, project planners frequently err in supposing that people have only economic motives in mind when they undertake resistance to DIDR. While violation of economic rights has proven to be a powerful motivator in resistance, a great deal of the moral content of resistance discourse derives its power from explicitly cultural issues pertaining to the right to persist as cultural entities, as well as to identity, spiritual links to land and the environment, and loyalty to both mythological and historical ancestors. It is reductionist to attribute resistance solely to economics or, for that matter, to cultural concerns. Human motivations in general are complex, and positions and actions in resistance to DIDR are adopted out of many interwoven concerns, rather than one overriding issue.

Two core concepts in resistance to DIDR are power and place. Power includes the ability to move people and things about the landscape in any way you see fit. Place attachment processes involve the behavioural, cognitive and emotional embeddedness of individuals in the relationship between their sociocultural and physical environments, providing a form of ontological stability. A place may become the matrix in which a repository of life experiences becomes embedded and therefore in some sense becomes inseparable from the feelings associated with them (Altman and Low 1992).

Attachment to places may involve the constellation of social relations, and the cultural values that inform them, of entire groups or communities. Places become identified with the genealogy and continuity of families and groups through history. Economic ties of individual or collective ownership, inheritance or other forms of appropriation, are fundamental to many place attachments, and cultural factors such as the intimate connections between environment and religion, cosmology and world-view, play significant roles in the relationship of a society to its land base and general environment. As Rodman notes, ‘Place then is both context and content, enacted and material. It is the lived world in physical form’ (1992: 650). Resistance to resettlement reveals how important a sense of place is in the creation of an ‘environment of trust’ in which space, kin relations, local communities, cosmology and tradition are linked (Giddens 1990: 102, cited in Rodman 1992: 648). Threats of removal from these physical and symbolic environments have generally elicited some form of resistance.

In the conflict of resistance, particularly for small, relatively isolated groups, more precise definitions of cultural identity are often worked out and conceptions of the community in broader national and global contexts may be developed. DIDR projects carry with them the potential for a virtually total undermining of local identity. Resettlement imposes forces and conditions on people that may transform their lives, evoking profound changes in environment, in productive activities, in social organisation and interaction, in leadership and political structure, and in
world-view and ideology. Resettlement not only relocates a people in space; it may also remake them. DIDR projects may directly or indirectly further two fundamental processes: the expansion of the state and integration into regional and national market systems. In most instances, DIDR projects initiate a restructuring of social, economic and political relationships to resemble those of the larger society. In that sense, resettlement will not necessarily destroy ‘local cultures’, but it will appropriate them and restructure them in terms of values and goals often originating from far beyond the local context (Garcia Cancini 1993).

Although many small societies face total assimilation and cultural disappearance, or ‘ethnocide’, as Bartolomé and Barabas (1973) have termed it, others have become conscious of their minority status and have constructed it in terms of an active defence of cultural identity and concerted political action. In effect, development projects can catalyse a shift in cultural consciousness from an ahistorical and acultural sense of identity to that of an ethnic group with a culture and identity to protect, in confrontation with a national society (Waldram 1980). The struggle to resist the Ralco Dam on the Biobio River in Chile has reunited Mapuche Indians, who have come to the region to reconnect with their communities. People who had hidden their indigenous identity began to reclaim their cultural heritage with pride (Evans 2001: 6). Although the damage they inflict can threaten the existence of subaltern groups, development projects can sharpen local identities through the oppositional process and resistance, and further the political development of subaltern groups. As such, development projects can produce inadvertent positive outcomes when they stimulate the development of civil organisations that are able to resist state excesses in their efforts to transform local systems (Smith, C. 1996: 47).

Cultural heritage refers to the historical memory of a community and is constituted in objects, resources, places and practices that locate a people in the universe, giving them a sense of identity through time. Such elements play a signal role in individual and collective identity formation, in the way that time and history are encoded and contextualised, and in interpersonal, community and intracultural relations. If CBA arrives at its conclusions through an objective calculation based on a constructed commensuration of values across a wide spectrum of costs and benefits, the cultural models or values that energise the discourse of those affected come from different sources, as is illustrated in the following.

You tell us to take compensation. What is the state compensating us for? For our land, for our fields, for the trees along our fields. But we don’t live only by this … Our gods, the support of those who are our kin – what price do you have for these? Our Adivasi [tribal] life: what price do you put on it? (Brava Mahalia, ‘Letter from a Tribal Village’, Lokayan Bulletin 11/2/3. Sept.-Dec 1994 in O’Neill 2001: 1866)
This is a letter written to the Chief Minister of Gujarat in India by a tribal person who was being displaced by the construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam, and who clearly differentiates between a set of values in which price is seen as a neutral measuring rod and a set of values that are based in the socially constructed relationship between a community and its environment (O’Neill 1996: 99). Essentially, land is an incommensurable entity. Government establishment of compensation levels for land and for cultural heritage resources settles nothing. The attempt simply sharpens political dispute.

Material compensation or reimbursement may be insufficient to enable people to reconstruct their culture and way of life after resettlement. Central to the ontological basis of many cultures are the notions of time and place. People are linked to places by residence in time as well as space. Long histories in a place in which family and community roots are deeply embedded tie generations to each other in a ‘community of memory’. It is through such communities of memory that people come to know themselves ‘as members of a people, as inheritors of a history and a culture that we must nurture through memory and hope’ (Bellah et al. 1985: 138). The power of memory as a mobilising force for resistance and protest long after resettlement frequently remains strong (Conuel 1981, Greene 1985, Gray 1996: 102, Bilharz 1998, Jing 1999, Jeffrey 2000).

The broad discursive styles associated with the two domains of human rights and science play key roles in the campaigns of resistance movements. Since the discourse of developers relies heavily on a scientific approach and discursive style, resisters are extremely careful about the accuracy of both their data and the factual basis for their arguments. NGOs have developed their own cadres of scientific experts, who often volunteer their services, from a diverse array of scientific fields to research and generate both data and perspectives to confront the arguments offered by developers and their funders. Consistently calling attention to the lack of adequate research, faulty methodology, the shoddiness of actual data collection, and the inconsistency and incompleteness of studies, the NGOs assume a position of scientific rigour as opposed to the politically compromised, biased and inferior science of the developers (McCully 1996).

The discourses developed by local people and their allies in the area of human rights are based on fundamental concepts of sacrifice and justice, and serve to question the morality of development projects that displace people. The listener or reader is called upon to recognise the sacrifice that people are forced to make in the name of development, and the injustice inflicted in inadequate or nonexistent compensation and faulty resettlement. The dishonesty and hypocrisy of governments that call upon the poorest to sacrifice for the benefit of the richest are themes that commonly appear in both the spoken and written discourse of resisters.
Another key theme in the human rights discourse involves an evocation of fidelity to a cultural heritage. Abandoning one’s land means separation from, and the loss of the right to express and to practice, one’s identity and religion. Accepting resettlement is equated with betraying one’s ancestors and everything that one stands for. Persecution, determination, martyrdom and finality are also themes that run through the human rights discourse. People consistently affirm their intentions to perish, either by drowning in reservoirs or at the hands of oppressive authorities, before they abandon their homes. Hunger strikes by both people and leaders of the NBA in India represent another form of this discourse of martyrdom and finality.

The Politics of DIDR Resistance

Although the actual resettlement project may be defined in social or, more commonly, economic terms, the phenomenon of resettlement is fundamentally a political one, involving the use of power by one party to relocate another. These power relations are conditioned by the climate of the various political contexts in which they are engaged. At the broadest level, the assimilation of global norms by states can produce new political spaces for NGOs, GROs and social movements to further their goals by holding states accountable for conformity with their own normative principles and rules. On the other hand, state institutions and practices are also embedded in local structures and are susceptible to pressure from domestic actors such as dominant classes and class coalitions, particular local interest groups or the interests of political élites (Khagram 1999: 29–31).

Local and transnational resistance to large-scale development projects will have the least success in states with authoritarian regimes and local actors with little or no capacity or political space to organise (Khagram 1999: 32). The free flow of information, both nationally and internationally, is absolutely essential for NGOs and their lobbying efforts for changing environmental and development policies (Khagram 1999: 40). In a democratic regime in which political parties vie for the votes of the electorate, DIDR resisters can take advantage of the competition among parties to further their agendas (Khagram 1999: 40–41). However, by the same token, when resisters come from the traditionally marginalised sections of a society, their lack of political power may make them less appealing to politicians (Bilbao 1998). Nevertheless, in regard to dams, Khagram argues persuasively that transnational NGOs, allied with grassroots organisations and social movements, have changed the terms of debate and significantly affected both policy and practice in the political economy of development in the Third World.
Barring immediate, outright and open conflict between people facing DIDR and the state and project authorities, most resistance at some point involves dialogue and negotiation among the various parties over such points as alternative sites, resource valuation methods, compensation levels and quality, timetables and eligibility for benefits, to name only a few key issues. DIDR resistance movements face considerable difficulty in their discussions with state or corporate authorities, due to the great imbalances of power that are usually based in the structure of the national political economic and sociocultural context (Davidheiser 2000). Often, as members of minority groups or the poor who live at the margins of national societies, people facing DIDR lack the economic, social and political capital necessary to affect decisions beyond the local level. The cultural gaps among the parties entering into negotiations, in which participants are not familiar with the cultures, values, norms or conventions of ordinary behaviour regarding issues of conflict and communication, can reduce the possibility of fair and just outcomes.

In some cases overcoming the power differential may be virtually impossible and weak parties should seek recourse in formal legal systems, rather than in modes of negotiation, to achieve just and equitable solutions (Nader 1994, 1997). However, options may also be limited there, since many marginalised groups have customarily been ignored or discriminated against by formal legal systems (Little 1999). Power disparities may actually reduce the likelihood of undertaking negotiations, since there is little to be gained by the stronger party in compromises that substantively address the interests and needs of all participants (Ott 1972).

Fisher and Ury (1981) have argued that good-faith negotiations, employing objective bases in presenting positions and arriving at group decisions, can reduce the role of pure power. If some specific criteria can actually be agreed upon, this can support the position of the weaker party, by bestowing the symbolic power of legitimacy, and can increase the possibility of successful outcomes by establishing some clear measures for making decisions (Davidheiser 2000). The chance of successful negotiations for weaker parties can also be improved if decision-making is relegated from a central bureaucracy to regional or local institutions, thus possibly reducing the social distance between local communities and state representatives (Penzich et al. 1994).

Another way to address the question of power imbalances in negotiations is the formation of alliances (Penzich et al. 1994). Allies provide a variety of significant resources including negotiating experience, material resources and, perhaps most importantly, information. Alliances with national and international NGOs have provided local-level DIDR resisters with leverage to engage administrators and funders of development projects in debate and negotiations (McDonald 1993: 9). The potential of these external parties to offset the great disparities in power, in negotiations
between local communities and the national or corporate forces that seek to relocate them. offers resists some opportunity for gain in such contexts.

**Scales of Interaction and Conflict**

When resistance movements develop, they tend to generate contacts and linkages with social actors that operate at four levels: the local community; the project; the national political context; and the international or global context. However, it is important to maintain the distinction between internal and external actors in a local DiOR situation. If the focus becomes too trained on external actors and their resources, it becomes easy to see local movements as only the outcome of external resources (Rothman and Oliver 1999: 43). Local activists are anything but passive recipients of external aid. The relationship between internal and external actors is reciprocal, and is composed of exchanges of resources, influence, information and validation.

**The Local Scale**

The majority of resistance movements emerge in response to a specific project in a specific local context, which may vary in size from one community or even part of a community to a very large region. Early confrontations of varying intensity may result from first encounters between local people and initial project personnel, ranging from puzzled reactions to physical assaults. However, in most cases, responses by local people are quite reasoned and frequently take the form of a request for dialogue and information. The response of project personnel to these requests is often so abrupt or evasive that resistance can move quickly to more activist stances.

When the decision to resist is taken and formalised, such action often evolves into the formation of grass-roots organisations. Furthermore, the speed and intensity of communications linking areas remote from each other establishes contact between groups with similar goals in other regions of the world, creating networks of resistance movements that share information and other resources. The networking and sharing of these experiences by resettled people with those threatened with resettlement resulted in the formation of the Regional Commission of Dam Refugees (CRAB) and eventually the nationwide organisation Movement of Dam-affected People (MAB), in Brazil (Bartolomé 1992, Serra 1993, Rothman and Oliver 1999).

People may reorient their central cultural symbols to construct interpretations of the threat of resettlement in very traditional forms. The Chinantecs and Mazatecs of Mexico recontextualised the threat of resettlement in mythological symbols, generating a resistance movement expressed largely in Messianic terms (Bartolomé and Barábas 1990:...
Regional levels of social and institutional development in local contexts also affect the action and organisation of DIDR resistance movements. Local DIDR resistance movements, however, risk becoming pawns of local and regional political parties if they tie their fortunes too closely to them (Baviskar 1992). Since resistance in effect constitutes a challenge to the state, the politics of state-local relations, in all their complexity, come to the fore.

Established leaders of the community, if they favour resistance, are frequently chosen to lead local movements. However, if they prove unsatisfactory or unequal to the task, new leadership may emerge in the context of the conflict. For example, the James Bay Cree, in response to the unfair negotiations with Hydro-Quebec, voted out three chiefs who were enthusiastic advocates of discussions with Hydro-Quebec and replaced them with three who were opposed to the proposals (Colchester 1999: 37). Success at leadership in resistance at the local level has led to important leadership roles at national and even international levels. Kayapo leadership, for example, has been composed of both traditional authorities and younger members of communities with greater experience of the outside world, who have been particularly astute in their understanding and use of local, national and international sources of power for resisting the Tucurui Dam and other Brazilian government and private initiatives affecting their land (Fisher 1994, Posey 1996: 125).

The role of Gramscian organic intellectuals, those individuals who have left the community for economic or educational purposes and then return to assist with the struggle, has been key in movement leadership (Rothman and Oliver 1999). In one case, a trained anthropologist, who is also a member of one of the Nahuatl communities that were threatened with DIDR by the San Juan Tetelcingo dam, became a spokesperson, activist and analyst of that resistance movement (Celestino 1999).

Women have played important roles in organisational leadership and in spearheading resistance movement activities, and have been at the forefront of voices condemning DIDR. Without question, one of the most notable leaders of a resistance movement today is Medha Patkar, the charismatic leader of the Narmada Bachao Andolan, who has played a major role not only in the development of that organisation, but also in the transnational antidam movement and in the evolution of the discourse on sustainable development. She also became a commissioner when the WCD was established, and in its final report made an independent comment in which she continued to challenge the reigning model of development as leading to the marginalisation of the majority, despite any precautions that might be recommended by the Commission (WCD 2000: 321–22). In many ways, she has come to symbolise resistance to DIDR around the world. The active role taken by many women in the organisation, leadership and action of anti-DIDR resistance movements is
both the result of, and a contributing factor to, increasing changes in the status and roles of women in societies all over the world.

The Project Scale

The quality of the resettlement project itself may play a major role in the decision to accept or resist DIDR (Chambers 1970). Many DIDR resisters maintain that adequate and just resettlement is impossible from the outset, leaving total opposition to the project as the only strategic option. Other resisters do admit the possibility of adequate and just resettlement, and commit themselves to achieving that goal. One of the best outcomes that might be imagined for DIDR projects is to work out a system in which people can materially sustain themselves while they themselves begin the process of social reconstruction. However, if the level of impoverishment experienced by most resettled peoples is any indicator, even adequate systems of material reproduction are beyond either the will or the capabilities of most contemporary policy makers and planners. Projects almost inevitably have generated high levels of impoverishment, dissatisfaction and often resistance, even after resettlement has taken place. When national resettlement policy is inferior or nonexistent, DIDR resistance at the project level may become a means to improve policies at a national level. The support of international allies is crucial in such cases (Cernea 1993: 32).

Although difficult to assess exactly, it is not far-fetched to attribute a significant proportion of DIDR resistance to the appallingly bad basic research, planning and implementation of resettlement projects. Here DIDR resistance rejects a poor resettlement project and produces strategies of negotiation to improve the terms and conditions of resettlement, such as better replacement land, increased compensation for losses or increased housing allowances. However, where policy makers are sensitive, DIDR-project protest and resistance can lead to the improvement of poor policy. There is little question that protest over, and resistance to, specific projects are responsible for the increased attention to the deficiencies in resettlement policy by national authorities, and that they have also contributed to the adoption of guidelines for resettlement projects at the World Bank and other multilateral organisations (Morse and Berger 1992, Cernea 1993, Gibson 1993, Guggenheim 1993, Serra 1993). In the final analysis, resettlement projects must be well designed and communicated, affording resettled people some control and understanding of their circumstances, if they are to have any chance of effectively reducing the impacts of DIDR (Cernea 1988: 15). Some, however, argue very convincingly that positive, productive resettlement schemes are extremely difficult to achieve, even under the best of circumstances, and inevitably promote cultural disintegration (Chernela 1988: 20).
The National Scale

The national scale of action involves the two major institutions that develop projects that require DIDR: the state and the private sector. Ethnic or class differences between state and project personnel and local people often complicate the relationship between local contexts and the state in resettlement situations (Colson 1971, Zaman 1982, Wali 1989, Bartolomé and Barbas 1990, Oliver-Smith 1991). In some cases a secondary and somewhat covert goal of resettlement is actually state control and integration of ethnic minorities, and resistance will be expressed in terms of a defense of ethnicity as well as territory (Zaman 1982). However, the state is not a monolithic structure. It is composed of different agencies, departments and ministries, which may have competing agendas. Similarly, the personnel of those state entities are not always of uniform class, ethnic or regional origin. DIDR resisters may find sympathetic individuals and supportive entities within the apparatus of the state. For example, state governments in Brazil supported the resistance to dams to be constructed by ELETROSUL, and the Environmental Ministry Working Group in India sided with the NBA against the states of Maharashtra, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh.

The availability of political rights, such as that of speech or assembly, condition the possibility and kind of political space for DIDR resistance (Magee 1989, Bartolomé 1992, Robinson 1992). DIDR resistance generally is part of a broad national network of human rights and environmental movements that exert pressure for change in civil and political rights policies. DIDR resistance movements in various locations in Mexico are part of an array of interests that have produced an epochal change in national politics with the defeat of the Partido Revolucionario Institucionalizado (PRI), which had ruled Mexico for more than seventy years.

Increasingly today, national and state governments are giving way to private-sector development interests in the planning, financing and construction of large infrastructural projects. Private-sector driven DIDR presents a different set of challenges to resistance movements because corporations are not subject to the same restraints and guidelines imposed by multilateral lenders that states are. Resistance movements can challenge the state to live up to guidelines for resettlement agreed upon as part of the terms of the loan. With private-sector development, despite apparent attention to guidelines, there is generally little evidence that corporate compliance with international human rights standards and development policies and procedures is forthcoming (Feeney 2000). NGOs and DIDR resistance movements have undertaken selected campaigns to boycott the products of companies involved directly in DIDR projects or indirectly through funding guarantees (International Rivers Network 2000b).
The importance of the media to movements resisting DIDR, in documenting and publicising the processes through which much DIDR is carried out and the impacts that it has on the lives of people, cannot be understated. Accurate and timely information is essential to the struggles of people resisting DIDR to enable them to formulate appropriate strategies and tactics, as well as to communicate the challenges they face, and the conditions they suffer, to others. In this effort, the role of the print and visual media is indispensable.

Whether made by the affected people themselves or by others, film and video in particular have become important tools in the struggles against DIDR around the world. Information technology, greatly facilitating the dissemination of both the printed word and still and moving images, has become an essential feature of DIDR resistance. Thus, Kayapo individuals have become skilled videographers of their own culture and of their interactions with Brazilians in resisting resettlement. The websites of NGOs, social movements and GROs constitute a key feature of struggles of those resisting DIDR. Visitors can find out how to contribute support for these struggles, influence policy, send letters to appropriate authorities, order more information and offer their own ideas through bulletin boards (Weeks 1999: 20).

One of the most significant aspects of information technology for ‘electronic politics’ (cyberactivism) is the speed with which it transmits information, and consequently the speed and level of organisation of response that the information elicits globally. Indeed, such is the speed with which information is now disseminated that central governments are sometimes among the last to learn of events and are forced into a reactive position by national and international DIDR allies. The links between websites and listservers representing many different interests enable a single individual or group to ‘connect with’ and inform many thousands of people all over the world with one message.

The International Scale

DIDR resistance movements have participated increasingly in global dialogues on development policy, as well as in discussions about changes in practice in specific institutions. DIDR resistance movements and their NGO allies were among those who pressured successfully for the establishment of the WCD. In this sense, DIDR resistance movements are important contributors to what many see as a fundamental transition in the terms of global development discourse.

Greater interest from the World Bank has arisen in projects addressing the alleviation of rural poverty, and in shifting the emphasis towards social impacts (Shihata 1993). This shift has been due to the intensity of rural protest and resistance as well as the public embarrassment of the
Bank at the catastrophic consequences of resettlement resulting from development projects it had funded. Like national governments, multilateral development banks (MDBs) are complex, internally diverse organisations, composed of individuals and groups with particular specialisms and interests. DIDR resisters at all levels can find sympathisers and allies in their struggles within MDBs. The results of the efforts of individuals within MDBs can be seen in the creation of guidelines for resettlement by such MDBs as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Although these guidelines recommend that DIDR be avoided where possible, they are nevertheless clearly developed within the framework of the model of development that necessitates such large-scale projects as are likely to give rise to resettlement.

The exposure of project failures and their impacts in the media created pressure for the formulation of a set of resettlement policy guidelines within the World Bank (see Rich 1994). The result was 'Operational Directive 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement' (OD 4.30), which called for: minimising resettlement; an improvement in or restoration of living standards, earning capacity and production levels; the participation of people faced with resettlement in project activities; a resettlement plan; and valuation and compensation for assets lost (World Bank 1990: 1-2). When problems with projects continued, the Bank advocated the formulation and implementation of resettlement legislation in borrower nations, producing policy changes in such nations as Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, and in other development agencies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (Cernea 1993: 32, Shihata 1993). However, a number of nations have seen the OD 4.30 guidelines as an infringement on national sovereignty. Furthermore, adoption of formal policies, either by the World Bank or borrower nations, is no assurance of adequate implementation. In addition, the degree to which projects financed by private capital must adhere to these and subsequently modified guidelines and procedures established by the Bank is far from clear. The World Bank-commissioned independent report on the Narmada Sardar Sarovar project in India (Morse and Berger 1992), which recommended cessation of the project pending major improvements in environmental and social monitoring and implementation, resulted in the rejection of further World Bank funding of the project by the government of India. Recent efforts (World Bank 2001) to alter the OD 4.30 version of the guidelines were seen by human rights and environmental groups as attempts to weaken safeguards, particularly for indigenous peoples, and were responded to with an internet and letter campaign of protest. The new guidelines, glossed as 'operational policies' and 'best practices', are seen by many resisters as a World Bank response to accusations by borrower nations that the guidelines infringe on issues that are properly the domain of state sovereignty.
NGOs have severely criticised the performance of MDBs and other international agencies in DIDR projects, with the aim of reforming their internal guidelines and policies. Of particular concern is the fact that the International Finance Corporation and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency guidelines for projects are less strict and comprehensive than the World Bank’s Operational Directive (Fox and Brown 1998, Khagram 1999: 397). Grass-roots organisations, NGOs and social movements involved in resistance to DIDR have also acquired or developed legal personnel, expertise and general knowledge that enable them to sue projects for violation of national civil and human rights law, as well as of international accords (Johnston 2000).

Resisters and their allies in NGOs and social movements have succeeded in communicating their position, backed by solid documentation, through declarations at numerous international meetings and conferences over many years, including most recently the Manibeli Declaration of 1994, the Curitiba Declaration at the First International Meeting of Dam Affected Peoples in Curitiba (Brazil) in 1997, and the Walker Creek Declaration at the International Seminar on Strategies for Dam Decommissioning in 1998. NGOs also continue with their Multilateral Development Bank Campaign, putting pressure on national donors of funds and banks to withhold funds for dams and other projects that displace people against their will.

The multiplicity of organisational forms and levels of action inevitably involve tensions and problems of coherence, consistency and contradiction for all participants in the struggles against DIDR. However, thus far, the coherence between grass-roots communities, co-operating NGOs, national social movements and transnational networks has been sufficient to gain the right to sit at the negotiating table for many projects of national scale, and enough political and social power to influence the policies of multilateral development organisations.

The Results of DIDR Resistance

Since DIDR resistance movements frequently confront vastly more powerful forces, there may be considerable costs involved. At the most basic and most profound level, there may be serious personal risks in resisting. In Guatemala in 1982 about four hundred Maya Achi men, women and children from communities resisting resettlement related to the Chixoy Dam were killed by military and paramilitary forces (Colajacomo 1999: 68). Beatings and detentions for indeterminate periods of time without due process are also among the risks of resistance. Ethnic, religious, caste or class prejudices may also buttress the ideological justification for such abuse.
There may also be considerable economic costs to resistance. Resistance has opportunity costs: it requires human and economic resources for organisation, communication and mobilisation, few of which may be actually present in sufficient surpluses in project-affected regions to underwrite the costs of resistance. Where resettlement is already underway, resisters may run the risk of exclusion from benefits that people who have accepted resettlement receive. Resisters can become scapegoats, and may be punished by receiving inadequate state support.

Resistance may create problematic relations with local and regional elements of local power and/or authority structures that might have benefitted from the project’s success. The defeat of a dam planned for the state of Guerrero in Mexico has assured the Nahuatl people of remaining on their land. However, it would appear that one of the costs of their victory is forgoing future state development assistance. Despite the fact that the resisting communities fall within a zone targeted for federal aid for the marginalised, they have received no federal assistance in ten years (Garcia 2000).

Failure to halt a development project does not always mean that positive outcomes are not forthcoming. Failed resistance efforts can gain a measure of success if they can bring about improvements in the terms and conditions of resettlement. If resistance activities threaten to increase the costs sufficiently, resisters can gain bargaining space to improve the resettlement project. Resistance movements that emerge from local responses and require the participation of local people generate invaluable experience in dealing with outside agencies and institutions. The acquisition of allies may make available other resource pools, injecting new skills, technology and access to specialised economic resources into the local context. Successful resistance constitutes a form of self-affirmation that can serve as a stimulus leading to a florescence of local culture and greater local autonomy. The demands that resistance movements voice for greater citizen participation in decision-making, for access to information and for respect for civil and political liberties, can also signify progress towards a more responsive and representative society.

From the perspective of NGOs, social movement allies and transnational networks, stopping the project is just one battle in a war with many fronts against certain models or approaches to development and the institutions associated with them. The experience of the antidam movement over the last thirty years has proved instructive in the struggle to alter approaches to development. The milestone meetings of dam-affected people from around the world and their Declarations at Manibeli and Curitiba, representing a global mobilisation through networking and external support, as well as the validation of many of its arguments and contentions by the Morse Report and the WCD, will serve as major examples for resistance to other forms of unsustainable and undemocratic development.
Conclusion

Regardless of the specific issues being contested in a given case, people resist DIDR because they recognise that certain basic rights that they consider legitimate are being abridged. Principal among these are the rights to self-determination and the control of one's own life and future. The threat of DIDR amounts to the potential loss of the right to self-determination; in effect, the loss of relative control over self and community (Scudder and Colson 1982). Resistance to DIDR, then, must be considered as a form of legitimate expression of the defence of the right to self-determination, as well as a defence of land, religion or identity. People also reject the loss of autonomy and the extreme form of political domination that resettlement both signifies and enacts, and their resistance questions whether resettlement can ever be development or empowering. Their resistance is, in some fundamental form, an act of self-empowerment, as it constitutes:

- a rejection of the dominant society's cultural construction of the poor, ethnic minorities, and peasants as incapable, powerless and unworthy of consideration;
- part of the effort to democratise their societies;
- an articulation of local needs and priorities;
- an analysis of project deficiencies (project problems do not originate with people and are not the resettled people's fault); and
- a demand for accountability and responsibility from government, development agencies and MDGs for actions taken in the name of social policy and development.

The messages that resisters seek to communicate are not difficult to understand, but do require a perspective that is capable of re-evaluating often deeply embedded suppositions about the nature, quality and scale of the development process, forms of governance and power sharing, and minority-majority relations. DIDR resisters and their allies at a variety of levels insist that if development is to be a truly democratic process that reflects both the interests and participation of all the affected parties, then:

- the legitimacy of the right of the state to relocate people and appropriate property with or without compensation must be re-examined;
- appropriate and just forms and levels of compensation must be determined in consultation with affected people;
- local rights must be recognised because development projects are felt first at the local level;
- development must be defined and evaluated qualitatively as well as quantitatively;
in a given case, people’s rights that they contest are the rights to their own life and future. The right of self-determination of self and community, and, more generally, the right of self-empowerment, as well as the natural construction of the incalpable, powerless and voiceless;

problems do not originate in the people’s fault; and

responsibility from government, actions taken in the name of the community are not difficult to communicate, for they are capable of re-evaluating the nature, quality and scale of involvement, power sharing, and their allies at a variety of levels; and the somewhat democratic process that involves all the affected parties, then:

relocation and reappropriation must be re-examined;

a system of compensation must be proposed for people;

development projects are evaluated qualitatively and as a source for viable, less destructive alternatives;

the method and focus of decision-making must shift from purely economic criteria to more dialogic forms of participatory decision-making; and

if it is to be seen as the justification for development projects, then national purpose has to be defined pluralistically and projects have to be demonstratively inclusive – a national purpose that requires only sacrifices from those least able to absorb them for the benefit of those who least need them is authoritarian, regardless of the supposedly democratic character of the regime.

There are obvious points of tension that can occur between a population threatened with resettlement, which resists to gain a better negotiating position for better resettlement conditions, and allies at other levels who may have more systemic goals, reaching beyond the local context to question the dominant models of development. Local resistance dramas ‘in the shadow land … at the outer edge of the realm of politics’ may thus become internationalised, the actors becoming participants in the changing arena of global political culture (Falk 1983: 25, as quoted in Wilmer 1993: 39; see also Fisher 1995).

The major challenge within DIDR resistance is maintaining the coherence between the agendas, goals and discourses of the participants at all levels of the struggle. When the local dramas of resistance to resettlement are cast in terms of national debates, attracting the attention of national and international NGOs and multilateral and international institutions, then people under threat of resettlement become active participants in a larger global dialogue. In effect, resistance to resettlement is helping to reframe the entire contemporary debate on development, the environment and human rights – a debate that shows considerable signs of expanding and gaining increasing relevance to both national development and human rights policy, as well as to international standards.

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