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# APPLIED ANTHROPOLOGY

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## *Domains of Application*

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Edited by Satish Kedia and John van Willigen

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# 7 Applied Anthropology and Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement

Anthony Oliver-Smith

## Introduction

There are few more bitterly contested issues in the field of development today than the displacement and resettlement of people and communities by large-scale infrastructural projects. The World Bank has calculated that publicly and privately funded development projects displace approximately 10 million people a year (Cernea and McDowell 2000). Characteristically, people and communities are displaced by capital-intensive, high technology, large-scale development projects that convert farmlands, fishing grounds, forests, and homes into dam-created reservoirs, irrigation schemes, mining operations, plantations, colonization projects, highways, urban renewal, industrial complexes, and tourist resorts favoring regional, national, or global interests. Putatively designed to spur economic growth and spread general welfare, many of these projects leave local people permanently displaced, disempowered, and destitute (Koenig 2000). Anthropologists in the mid-twentieth century were among the first to recognize, report on, and work toward mitigating the serious impoverishment and gross violations of human rights that occurred among populations resettled by development projects (Butcher 1971; Brokensha and Scudder 1968; Colson 1971; Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982).

Despite the participation of other fields, anthropology can reasonably claim to be the foundational discipline of the field of development-induced

displacement and resettlement research (DIDR). Because DIDR impacts virtually every domain of community life, anthropology's holistic approach equips it well to address the inherent complexity of the resettlement process. It is also in DIDR that anthropology has arguably made the single strongest, tangible, and internationally documented and recognized contribution to development policy and practice over the last quarter century. Since the 1950s, anthropologists have spanned the entire field of DIDR in basic and applied research, policy formulation, theory building, evaluation, planning, implementation, and community- and NGO-based resistance movements. Anthropologists have helped to frame and contribute to current debates concerning DIDR on human and environmental rights, policy frameworks and guidelines, implementation, evaluation, the limits of state sovereignty, and the agendas of international capital. In the context of current intensified development agendas, because of its central role in the field, anthropology has a responsibility to expand the array of approaches and methods that address the challenges presented by DIDR at the local community and project level, in national and international political discourse, and in the policy frameworks of multilateral institutions.

Despite the fact that in the phrase development-induced displacement and resettlement three basic ideas—development, displacement, and resettlement—are linked, there has not always been, nor is there now, any necessary relationship among them. Development obviously can take place without displacement or resettlement. Many people who are displaced by development projects are never resettled, and they either succumb to the impacts of dislocation or find themselves consigned to the margins of society and economy. Further, the vast majority of those displaced by development who are in fact resettled suffer the outcomes of inadequately financed, poorly designed, and incompetently implemented resettlement projects that bear no resemblance to any honestly rendered interpretation of the concept of development. Hence, there is no necessary or inevitable linkage between development, displacement, and adequate, humane resettlement.

The trauma and hardships experienced by the displaced pose critical moral questions about the nature, scale, and ethics of such development models and practices. Generally, development as a goal of public policy is aimed at improving levels of well-being through enhancing productive capacity, based on the premise that increased production and income will filter through the system to enhance general patterns of consumption. Enhanced productive capacity is posited on a principle of efficient use of resources to render maximum market value (Penz 1992, 107). National governments and private developers assess that local users do not efficiently exploit resources, and they argue that large-scale projects produce greater

value, thereby enhancing levels of overall economic development. Projects that displace communities justify themselves ethically with the belief that greater value production increases consumption and welfare at all levels of society. When projects force people to resettle, the process may be defined in economic terms, but resettlement is fundamentally a political phenomenon, involving the use of power by one party to relocate another. Current trends suggest that development strategies will continue to stress large-scale projects that will result in the resettlement of large numbers of people. The extent to which this process can be carried out ethically, democratically, and effectively is an issue of considerable dispute.

For local people, often members of indigenous or minority groups and their allies in the global networks of social movements and NGOs, the rights to land and other resources, self-determination, cultural identity, environmental protection, and more sustainable forms of development are central to the survival of their communities. Their claims emphasize the rights of the less powerful, the significance of cultural diversity, and the sustainability of environments over what they consider ecologically risky, economically questionable, and socially destructive projects (Oliver-Smith 2001). They point to the consistent failures of governments and private developers to adequately fund, plan, and train personnel for the complex tasks of DIDR, resulting in the impoverishment of the displaced. Deploying international covenants, they have actively broadened the agenda to include questions of human and environmental rights and justice in development, frequently converting their discourses of resistance into alternative models and strategies for socially responsible development. The central issue in DIDR is the democratic character of the development process.

## **Development-Induced Displacement in the Twentieth Century**

In terms of sheer numbers, the twentieth century saw more people displaced and set in motion against their will than any other in recorded history. The wars and environmental havoc that have uprooted millions have been compounded by the global drive to develop. Despite sharing many similarities, displacement caused by development projects is different in important ways from the dislocation experienced by participants in voluntary relocation schemes, victims of natural or technological disasters, or refugees from civil or international conflicts. In DIDR people are “pushed” to move rather than “pulled” or attracted by better possibilities elsewhere. DIDR is entirely involuntary, despite the inducements devised to attract people to voluntarily resettle. Furthermore, although wars that turn people

into refugees are the outcome of intentional decisions taken by political authorities, the general consensus is that they should be avoided whenever possible. However, large development projects, also the result of intentional decisions by authorities, are seen to fit well within national ideologies of development. In effect, empowered by international standards that grant the state the right to take property for national goals, such projects are justified by a cost-benefit analysis that assigns losses and gains on a political basis. Finally, unlike the victims of disasters or wars, there is no returning home once the situation has stabilized. DIDR is permanent. There can be no return to land that is submerged under a dam-created lake or a neighborhood that is under a stadium or a highway. Thus, the solutions that are devised to meet the needs of development-induced displacees must be durable rather than contingency-based emergency strategies to meet immediate needs until people can return home (Guggenheim and Cernea 1993, 3-4).

The problem of development-induced displacement and resettlement expresses the frequent tensions in development between local and national needs. In DIDR the needs of societies to develop their infrastructure to produce more energy, better water supplies, more efficient transportation systems, or more productive agriculture are balanced against the welfare of the local communities that face displacement and possible resettlement to make room for such projects. The costs of DIDR that are born by local people are balanced against the benefits that the entire society will purportedly enjoy from the implementation of the project.

## Applied Anthropological Research in Displacement and Resettlement

Despite the long history of involuntary displacement by development projects, systematic research on its effects and outcomes, whether people were formally resettled or not, did not begin until the 1950s. Research on displacement emerged from the postwar concern for the welfare and fate of the enormous numbers of refugees in World War II. The pioneer document was Alexander Leighton's *The Governing of Men: General Principles and Recommendations based on Experiences at a Japanese Refugee Camp* (1945). Although based on a case of politically forced relocation, Leighton introduced in his research many of the issues that would become central to the concerns of anthropologists who undertook research with development-induced displacement in the 1950s, particularly in the realms of stress, social organization, and forms of resistance. In 1952 Elizabeth Colson and Thayer Scudder began long-term research on the social and ecological consequences of resettlement among the Gwembe Tonga, who were relocated by the con-

struction of the Kariba Dam in what was to become Zambia and Zimbabwe (Colson 1971; Scudder 1973; Scudder and Colson 1982). The 1950s saw the topic attract increasing interest elsewhere in Africa (Chambers 1970; Fahim 1983), as well as in Asia (Dobby 1952) and Latin America (Villa Rojas 1955), as postwar and, subsequently, postcolonial development efforts accelerated.

In roughly the same period, sociologists in the United States began to consider the impacts of displacement on neighborhoods affected by urban renewal and large-scale construction projects, developing important perspectives on grief and mourning for lost homes among resettled people (Fried 1963; Gans 1962). In the 1960s, efforts at developing conceptual models of the displacement and resettlement process began to appear. Robert Chambers proposed a three-stage model based on voluntary land settlement projects in Africa (1969). Nelson, working on new land settlements in Latin America, developed a similar approach (1973). The problems associated with DIDR provoked a response in the form of an organizational manual for resettlement from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (Butcher 1971).

In the 1970s the problems experienced by people affected by the growing number of development projects were linked to those of people displaced by the expansion of conflicts as well as major natural disasters (Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982). At that time, Scudder and Colson, addressing the responses of dislocated peoples regardless of cause, proposed a stress-based four-stage process of recruitment, transition, potential development, and incorporation (1982; see below for more discussion). The field of displacement and resettlement studies expanded considerably in the 1980s, especially because concern about the environmental and social impacts of large infrastructure projects, particularly dams, began to be expressed. Indeed, two World Bank research and policy specialists speculated that the 1980s might go down in history as "the decade of displacement" (Guggenheim and Cernea 1993, 1). A key element in the growth of this concern about DIDR was the expansion of well-organized and widely publicized resistance movements in regions where projects were displacing and resettling many thousands of people, such as Brazil, India, Thailand, Mexico, and many other nations. As the resistance movements publicized the many inadequacies of displacement and resettlement policies and practices, the problem of DIDR moved to center stage in the debates regarding the development process, and it gained the attention of the general public and the research community alike.

Many of the studies stimulated by the massive increase in the number of people displaced by development projects in the 1980s followed the lead of Colson and Scudder in documenting the social impacts and injustices of the

displacement process, focusing on the characteristics of the stresses of dislocation and resettlement, patterns of individual and group reactions, the similarities and differences among the various forms of displacement and resettlement, and assessment of the negative outcomes imposed on people in the resettlement process. The researchers as well as the locations of research were international. Particularly in those nations in which large-scale infrastructural development processes were being funded from national, international, and multilateral sources, a considerable body of DIDR research began to emerge. Those governmental and multilateral institutions, as well as international private consulting organizations, began to produce increasing amounts of material on DIDR in the form of a substantial "gray literature" composed of feasibility studies, project evaluations, and in-house reviews of policies and outcomes, many of them researched and authored by anthropological staff or consultants (e.g., Rew and Driver 1986).

In similar fashion, NGOs that allied themselves with the displaced also called on anthropologists to produce lengthy documentation substantiating the deficiencies of DIDR policy and negative project impacts (e.g., Aspelin and Coelho dos Santos 1981; Barabas and Bartolome 1973; Feit and Penn 1974). In India, for example, researchers documented the displacement of thousands by development projects, the lack of any resettlement efforts for many of the displaced, and the failures and inadequacies of those resettlement projects that were provided for the affected peoples (Fernandes and Thukral 1989). By the same token, in Mexico, where researchers had begun documenting the social impact of dam construction in the early 1950s, analysis of the displacement and relocation process for the Cerro de Oro Dam assessed the impacts as a process of "ethnocide" (Barabas and Bartolome 1973). Other dam projects that resettled people were also documented (Ballasteros, Edel, and Nelson 1970). Researchers in Brazil, where the government had proposed a nationwide 80-dam hydropower development initiative, also began to explore the implications of large-scale relocation and resettlement projects, particularly for indigenous and peasant populations in the Amazon region (Santos and de Andrade 1990; Sigaud 1986).

The case of the Tucuruí Dam in Northeast Brazil is emblematic of the problems caused by poorly planned and implemented resettlement projects. The Tucuruí Dam, the largest in the tropics and fourth largest in the world, is part of an overall plan of the Brazilian government to build 80 dams to reduce national dependence on petroleum-generated power. Before the gates closed in 1984, flooding 2,850 square kilometers of forest, including part of the Parakana Indian reservation, between 20,000 and 30,000 people had to be relocated. The Brazilian government and the administrating



agency, Eletronorte, had a woefully inadequate resettlement policy that affected only a minority of those relocated upstream from the dam and obligated many to fend for themselves in settlements upriver and along the trans-Amazon highway (Biery-Hamilton 1987). Even those who were included in the resettlement scheme were inadequately compensated for their losses. Environmental impacts both upstream and downstream of the dam became the motors for significant protest and resistance that eventually empowered local people for future negotiations with the state (Scudder 1996).

Upstream from the dam, an area known as the Parakana Glebe, located close to the bank of the reservoir, suffered severe environmental impacts. Many people displaced by the reservoir were relocated to the Parakana Glebe. In effect, the filling of the dam had transformed the Glebe from a forest fluvial environment to a lacustrine ecosystem. The reservoir area closest to the Glebe had not been deforested prior to submersion, and when the reservoir was filled in early 1986, the decaying and floating vegetation provided an ideal spawning habitat for mosquitoes. The insects proliferated uncontrollably and soon became a virtual plague. They soon spread from the lakeside to secondary breeding grounds on roads and to certain trees in the forest whose foliage collects considerable water. Initially, the resettled communities attempted to endure the conditions, going about their normal activities, but the infestation became "unbearable. Nobody could work anymore, or even sleep. . . . Then desperation came, we became really desperate. People abandoned their lots and went to look for some solution. The government should have helped people in that calamity" (interview with a Union leader/STR-NR, February 1996, quoted in Acselrad and da Silva 2000, 5).

A series of epidemics, including malaria and leishmaniasis, a disfiguring and potentially fatal skin infection, swept over the area, and many of the roughly 8,000 people living close to the reservoir had to abandon their farms and homes (McCully 2001, 93). Indeed, as people experienced these new conditions of misery and disease, their interpretations linking the lack of deforestation in the submerged area closest to them with the creation of ideal breeding conditions for mosquitoes generally coincided with scientific assessments. However, scientific caution, based on a lack of field studies, resulted in no assignment of direct causality and enabled Eletronorte to challenge these conclusions and assign blame to the population itself. Eletronorte claimed that waste runoff from the communities themselves created conditions that allowed mosquitoes to proliferate, thereby setting up an environmental debate between the resettlement authority and the people. However, in 1991 evidence confirmed that mosquito larvae were present in

the vegetation that emerged after the filling of the reservoir. The lack of an effective policy to combat the plague, the problematic nature of the empirical information, and the severe impact on health and living conditions led the people to begin negotiations with land-tenure agencies, ministries, local governments and politicians, and subsequently to Brasilia to the ministries, the national congress, and the president. From these negotiations a new settlement project was established, albeit with new sets of problems, primarily competing landlords and their hired thugs (unless otherwise noted, this section is based on Acselrad and da Silva 2000).

In addition, approximately 40,000 *caboclos* (peasants) who lived downstream on the hundreds of islands between the dam and the mouth of the river began to suffer serious ecological and economic impacts. In the course of research undertaken by Magee four years after the close of the dam gates, it was found that traditional subsistence strategies of riverine peasants were totally disrupted. As Magee noted, "if peasants above the dam suffered the loss of their land, peasants below the dam suffered the loss of their water" (1989, 6-7). The water below the dam became seriously polluted from decomposing trees in the flooded areas that were not cleared before the floodgates closed. In the four years after the dam began operation, the pollution of the water caused a series of outbreaks of waterborne diseases of various sorts, ranging from serious vaginal infections to gastrointestinal ailments, particularly among children, and skin rashes in the general population. Island crops suffered also from the polluted water. Cacao and *acai* palm production was crippled. However, the most serious consequence of the dam was the destruction of the river's shrimp and fish populations, the very base of the local subsistence economy and an important source of exchange value as well (Magee 1989).

Faced with the continuing destruction of their resource base by the dam, the riverine *caboclos* were left with two options: migration and resettlement or resistance designed to obligate the government to both recognize and compensate their losses and also to diminish the damaging impacts of the dam. In this effort, the Tucuruí River peasants began to engage in new forms of political mobilization to defend their way of life. They acquired two extremely important allies: the Catholic Church and the Rural Workers Union. At the top of the agenda of the new union leadership was the commencement of negotiations with Eletronorte and its consulting companies to establish responsibilities for the effects of the dam (Magee 1989). In the process, the peasants began to acquire the political skills that enabled them to represent their own interests. However, as Magee (1989, 10) noted, it remained to be seen whether the Tocantins Islanders could muster the international support they needed to survive on the islands or whether they

would join the ranks of the other disenfranchised groups competing for scarce land on the mainland.

Among the problems investigated by other researchers in many other nations were the failures of governments and government agencies to adequately fund resettlement projects or to adequately plan for them along with the infrastructural project and to train personnel to handle such a complex task. To some degree, the failure to take seriously the human rights of the affected people and the failure to understand the complexity and gravity of the impacts of the DIDR process characterized the arrogance and ignorance of authorities in many countries in both the developed and the developing worlds. Other researchers focused on failures in planning and implementation, such as land replacement, social stress, differential gender-based effects, ideological impacts, legal issues, compensation problems, lack of participation in project planning and implementation by local people, problems experienced by host populations, failure to provide economic support, ecological impacts, and urban planning and housing.

Although much of this research still focused on the negative outcomes of poorly planned and implemented resettlement projects and the lessons to be learned from these failures, a number of investigators turned their attention to the question of successful resettlement in those relatively few cases where it could be claimed. Recognizing the difficulty inherent in establishing a set of criteria against which such a multidimensional social process that usually transpired over many years, and sometimes decades, might be assessed for success, several researchers highlighted those projects that enjoyed partial success at one stage or another of development as beacons of light in the otherwise dismal record of DIDR.

Partridge, for example, considered that the Arenal Hydroelectric Project in Costa Rica succeeded in improving the standards of living and returning control over their own lives to the resettled people within five years of implementation of the project (all information on Arenal is drawn from Partridge 1993). The Arenal Hydroelectric Project involved the construction of a dam 70 meters high to produce a reservoir of 1,750 cubic meters, and it necessitated the displacement and resettlement of about 2,500 people (roughly 500 families). The final cost of the project was \$179 million, almost twice the originally estimated cost of \$91 million.

The area in which the project was located was a humid tropics cattle-ranching complex, a system that went through three developmental phases. The first phase involved the colonization of tropical forest by migrants who use slash-and-burn agriculture to begin small farms. The second phase involved the absorption of these small holdings by large cattle-ranches, which continued clearing the forest for pasture. The third phase resulted in

the depopulation of the region as land was taken over for pasture and both farming and employment opportunities decreased. The region to be affected by the dam was fully in the third phase, having already lost roughly a fourth of its population. The principal economic activity was cattle ranching, with little or no commercial agriculture. Subsistence agriculture was declining as well. In other words, the potential for the region for supporting the existing population was in rapid decline.

When the dam project was approved, resettlement planning began two years before actual construction began. The preparatory period consisted of 11 steps or phases. These 11 phases were:

- Phase I: Ethnographic Sample Survey of Communities
- Phase II: Information Campaign and Meetings with Families
- Phase III: Census of People and Property to be Affected
- Phase IV: Making Public the Planning Data
- Phase V: New Settlement Site Selection
- Phase VI: Action Plan for Resettlement Prepared
- Phase VII: Land Acquisition
- Phase VIII: Participation of the Affected Population
- Phase IX: Financial Mechanism for Restitution of Property
- Phase X: Construction of New Settlements
- Phase XI: Community and Agricultural Development

The first several years (1976–79) of the new communities were difficult. The resettled people cleared land and planted traditional crops such as maize, manioc, plantains, and bananas. Seeds and cuttings were made available to the farmers as soon as their new plots had been allocated. The agricultural system in the new settlements initially used the traditional slash-and-burn technology. Subsequently, new vegetable, tree, and pasture crops, which had been field-tested during the construction phase, began to be cultivated, particularly a new variety of coffee. Individual farmers obtained loans from the National Bank of Costa Rica to intensify production, and the farmers as a group organized a marketing cooperative. Income from coffee increased by roughly 100 percent over preresettlement levels. New grasses for cattle fodder also enabled farmers to increase the number of cattle pastured per hectare from one animal to three. A new road constructed by the Instituto Costarricense de Electrificación (ICE) linked the new communities to market centers and fostered the development of several small dairy farms.

Income from these initiatives stimulated purchases of additional farmlands, construction of outbuildings on farms, purchase of vehicles, and construction of a rural school building with no assistance from the government.

The success of the families in the farming sector nourished success in the commercial sector. Shopkeepers and their families benefited by the increased levels of cash income in the communities. Levels of fixed capital and inventory values in the new communities ranged between 50 and 200 percent greater than those in the old settlements. Furthermore, social organizational features developed in the new communities in the form of a school committee, a sports committee, and the continuation of the Catholic Church committee. Finally, the population of the new communities remained stable, halting the flight of people from an area they perceived as unable to sustain them.

Partridge attributed the successes achieved in the project to three basic steps in the preparation process. Good data collection and community studies carried out by social scientists resulted in a resettlement plan than was both realistic and practical. He also emphasized the importance of consultation with the people to be relocated and their meaningful participation in the preparation process. Also significant in the success of Arenal was the strategy of establishing the new farms on the basis of traditional crops and technology, allowing the farmers to continue with known practices for the initial period of adjustment. After three years, innovations were introduced when people were more able to assume risks, and the results significantly enhanced income generation, leading to long-term acceptance of the new settlements (Partridge 1993, 367).

Two recent publications of the World Bank, while acknowledging that major problems remain for people uprooted by development projects, maintain that improvements are being made in resettlement in DIDR planning and implementation. The Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) model developed by Cernea provides a significant tool for the prediction, diagnosis, and resolution of problems associated with DIDR (Cernea and McDowell 2000). A study by the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of five major bank-funded dam projects concluded that although better planning has occurred, it has not generally led to better involuntary resettlement. Furthermore, the public agencies charged with resettlement have not responded adequately to the challenge of resettlement. They also find that income restoration strategies, whether based on land-for-land or other options, have not in general been successful. The key to success, in their opinion, is genuine commitment to the resettlement process as a development opportunity by the borrower country (Picciotto, van Wicklin, and Rice 2001).

Generally, nondam-related of DIDR have been less fully documented and analyzed. Other forms of development-induced displacement, such as conservation, urban renewal, mining, public-use complexes, transportation,

and pipelines, have received generally less attention as causes of resettlement. One example of a well-documented nondam case is the Singrauli region of central India (Clark 2003). Although the initial transformation of the region and significant population displacement began in 1960 with the Rihand Dam, subsequent environmental destruction and the displacement of ultimately between 200,000 and 300,000 people, some of them displaced as many as three to five times, have been due to the massive exploitation of large deposits of coal that are found beneath the surface in the region. With World Bank loans, the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) established nine open-pit coal mines, which operate 24 hours a day, and it constructed the Singrauli Super Thermal Power Plant, the Vindhyaachal Super Thermal Power Plant and the Rihand Power Plant, all on the banks of the reservoir created by the original Rihand Dam. Three other power plants, although not run by the NTPC, have been added close by. The power plants subsequently attracted hundreds of factories and plants for chemical, aluminum, cement, and other forms of industrial production.

Local people were relocated into resettlement colonies as their agricultural land was appropriated for the dam and reservoir and later for the coal mines, power plants, roads, and markets, homes, and recreational grounds for NTPC workers. Ninety percent of the local people were relocated at least once, and 34 percent were uprooted several times as development in the region expanded. A study commissioned by the World Bank and the NTPC found that resettlement projects were unsuccessful in almost all the cases, failing to provide adequate facilities and equipment for water supply, sewage treatment, schools, education, or medical care. Moreover, industry-driven air, water, and soil pollution seriously contaminated the food chain and compromised the health of the population consigned to the resettlement colonies. Displacement forced formerly self-sufficient agriculturalists to become beggars seeking occasional labor in the industrial complex. The livelihoods and way of life of the resettled communities were utterly destroyed, and neither the NTPC nor the local government was willing to assume responsibility for their losses. Now known as the energy capital of India, Singrauli has also been compared to "the lower reaches of Dante's *Inferno*" (Clark 2003, 167–272).

As mentioned earlier, urban renewal and, more recently, gentrification in the developed world have been closely examined since the 1950s (e.g., Gans 1962; Fried 1963; Squires et al. 1987). With rapid urban growth in both the developed and developing worlds, projects ranging from public-use facilities (such as stadia, conference centers, government complexes) to slum clearance to major transportation redevelopment have displaced hundreds of thousands of people. Local authorities are increasingly employing eminent

domain to transfer property to private developers to spur economic growth (Cauchon 2004).

Conservation-driven resettlement is also receiving increasing attention (Brechtin et al. 2003). In 1980 the International Union for the Conservation of Nature published the *World Conservation Strategy*, challenging the national park model and advocating the incorporation of local people into the conservation process. The World Bank followed this initiative with a program called Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDP), intended to integrate local people into projects to enable them to benefit economically.

However, more recently, dissatisfaction with the outcomes of such projects has generated a more exclusionary strain within the conservation movement, dubbed the "protectionist paradigm" (Brechtin et al. 2003). It calls for a radical transformation of nature, namely the removal of all human inhabitants from environments deemed endangered (Terborgh 1999). This strategy entails the forced removal of people from their homelands, producing another variety of environmental refugee (Geisler and Da Sousa 2001). Barring outright displacement, the new protectionist paradigm advocates radically restricting resource-use practices employed by people resident in reserves and parks. Such restrictions constitute a form of structural displacement in that, although people have not been geographically moved, the norms and practices with which they have engaged the environment in the process of social reproduction have become so altered as to effectively change their environment from one that is known to one that must be newly encountered with new norms and new practices if social reproduction is to continue.

There is still considerable need for research on other forms of development-induced displacement. Much greater attention should be paid to privately funded development projects that induce displacement. The significance of this form of research will only increase in the coming decade as privatization of previously publicly provided services increases. Some private sector projects have developed their own resettlement plans and policies (Rio Tinto 2001). However, most privately funded development, such as the outcome of market factor speculation, presents significantly different problems for people affected by DIDR, in the disguised involuntary quality of market exchanges between parties of unequal power. Although private projects must agree to DIDR guidelines to get World Bank guarantees for lower interest rates, other private sector infrastructural initiatives that do not want or need the guarantees are free to subordinate the human and environmental rights of affected communities to corporate agendas and market logic.

## Applied Anthropological Practice in Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement

Anthropologists have been involved in an extremely wide array of activities and domains in their work on DIDR, spanning the entire field in activities as diverse, yet related, as applied research, policy formation, theory building, evaluation, planning, implementation, and resistance. They have also played major roles in the development of more appropriate policies within multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the Asian Development Bank regarding the planning and implementation of resettlement projects that accompany infrastructural development. They have authored the guidelines for best practices and procedures that such institutions require that borrower nations must comply with. World Bank Operational Directive 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement (OD 4.30), written by anthropologist Michael Cernea, called for minimal resettlement; improvement or restoration of living standards, earning capacity, and production levels; resettler participation in project activities; a resettlement plan; and valuation and compensation for assets lost (World Bank 1990, 1-2). Although these guidelines were hailed as an important step toward the reduction of damages, costs, and losses incurred by resettled peoples, their implementation in borrower nations has been consistently problematic. Although some have contended that, without the guidelines, the outcomes of many projects would have been incalculably worse, others assert that the guidelines have actually made things worse because they allow restoration of previous levels of development, which research has shown are rarely reached, leaving people in greater poverty. The Bank's response to this problem was to advocate the formulation and implementation of resettlement legislation in borrower nations, producing policy changes in several developing nations, such as Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, as well as other development agencies, like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the IADB (Cernea 1993, 32; Shihata 1993).

A number of nations see the OD 4.30 guidelines as an infringement of national sovereignty. Furthermore, adoption of formal policies, either by the World Bank or borrower nations, is no assurance of adequate implementation. In addition, the degree to which projects financed by private capital must adhere to the Bank's now modified guidelines and procedures is far from clear. The World Bank commissioned an independent report on the Narmada Sardar Sarovar Project in India (Morse and Berger 1992). The report recommended cessation of the project pending major improvements



in environmental and social monitoring and implementation, resulting in the rejection of further World Bank funding of the project by the government of India. Most recently, however, World Bank policy and guidelines have been weakened. The Board of Executive Directors approved revisions of the policy on involuntary resettlement that undermine protection for indigenous peoples and other peoples lacking formal title to lands, thus making it easier to carry out resettlement and, in some circumstances, reducing the World Bank's responsibility for certain kinds of displacement and resettlement impacts (Clark 2002, 10–11).

Often as consultants to these and other institutions, anthropologists have carried out the applied research necessary for informed planning and implementation of humane and development-oriented resettlement projects. Through the lifetime of projects, anthropologists have also evaluated the performance of projects in restoring incomes and enhancing social rearticulation among the resettled for individual and community recovery. For example, Partridge's study of the successful Arenal Hydroelectric Project was based on an evaluation that he did for IADB (1993).

By the same token, anthropologists have been actively engaged in advocacy work on behalf of affected communities. Working closely with groups and communities, anthropologists have joined in, legally contesting the decisions and actions of international financial institutions (IFIs) on behalf of communities facing DIDR. Anthropologists currently are in leadership roles in many NGOs that work at various levels to assist communities facing resettlement to gain better conditions or in resisting resettlement. They are part of the larger community of activists and scholars who keep close watch on policy formulation in lending institutions to guard against the dilution or weakening of any policy relating to DIDR (Fox and Brown 1998; Colchester 1993; Waldram 1980).

Grassroots organizations, NGOs, and social movements involved in resistance to DIDR have also acquired or developed legal personnel, expertise, and general knowledge that enable them to sue projects for violation of national civil and human rights law as well as international accords. The aforementioned growth of international human rights norms supplies a series of conventions and covenants that, although difficult to enforce in local circumstances, can be used to portray projects as being in violation of internationally accepted standards. The European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the United Nations Declaration on the Rights to Development (1986), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities (1992), the Articles of the International Labour Organization

(1944), and the United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (1994) all provide articles and protocols that can be used to portray projects in violation of human rights on the international stage. There are now much more active efforts to use these and other documents as means to achieve reparations for past injustices as well (Johnston 2000).

## **Theoretical Perspectives on Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement**

Initial attempts at theorizing DIDR focused less on rights to resources than on the most immediate and visible outcomes for the people involved. Although a number of models of the nature of voluntary planned settlement processes were developed in the late 1960s (Chambers 1970; Nelson 1973), there was little theoretical work on DIDR until Thayer Scudder and Elizabeth Colson developed a model based on the concept of stress to describe and analyze the process of involuntary dislocation and resettlement (1982). They posited that three forms of stress resulted from involuntary relocation and resettlement: physiological stress, psychological stress, and sociocultural stress. Physiological stress is seen in increased morbidity and mortality rates. Psychological stress has four manifestations: trauma, guilt, grief, and anxiety. Sociocultural stress is manifested as a result of the economic, political, and cultural effects of relocation. These three forms of stress, referred to as multidimensional stress, are experienced as affected people pass through the displacement and resettlement process. Scudder and Colson represented the process itself as occurring in four stages, which they label recruitment, transition, potential development, and handing-over/incorporation. Recruitment refers to the decisions taken by authorities regarding the population to be relocated, particularly those that influence the length and severity of the stressful transition stage. The transition stage begins when the population to be relocated is first affected. Generally speaking, the transition stage is the longest, and it is the stage in which the most severe multidimensional stress is experienced. The general attitude of people during the transition stage is conservative, in order to avoid the possibility of further risk and stress. The stage of potential development begins when people begin to abandon their conservative risk-avoidance strategies and express greater initiative and risk-taking behavior. Scudder and Colson emphasized that this stage is often never realized because many DIDR projects remain trapped in the transition stage by inept and inappropriate policy and implementation. Equally difficult to attain is the final stage of handing-over, or incorporation.

Achieving the incorporation stage signifies that the DIDR project has been successful. They define success as the achievement of local management of economic and political affairs and the phasing out of external agencies and personnel from day-to-day management of the community. The community has become able to assume its place within the larger regional context, which includes host communities and other regional systems.

At roughly the same time that Scudder and Colson were developing their model, an approach began in the political ecology literature focused on the linked ideas of vulnerability and risk. The concept of vulnerability was initially employed in disaster research to characterize the vast differences among societies in disaster losses from similar agents. An alternative perspective on human-environment relations, one that emphasizes the role of human interventions in generating disaster risk and impact, found that these sets of relations coalesced in the concept of vulnerability (Hewitt 1983). Vulnerability and risk, therefore, refer to the relationships among people, the environment, and the sociopolitical structures that frame the conditions in which people live. The concept of vulnerability thus integrates not only political and economic conditions but also environmental forces in terms of both biophysical and socially constructed risk. This understanding of vulnerability enabled researchers to conceptualize how social systems generate the conditions that place different kinds of people, often differentiated along axes of class, race, ethnic, gender, or age, at different levels of risk.

As these concepts gained currency, Cernea began to write about the risks of poverty resulting from displacement by water projects (1990). He subsequently developed his well-known Impoverishment Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) approach to understanding (and mitigating) the major adverse effects of displacement, in which he outlined eight basic risks to which people are subjected by displacement (1995; Cernea and McDowell 2000). The model is based on the three basic concepts of risk, impoverishment, and reconstruction. Deriving his understanding of risk from Giddens's (1990) notion of the possibility that a certain course of action may produce negative effects, Cernea modeled displacement risks by deconstructing the "syncretic, multifaceted process of displacement into its identifiable, principle and most widespread components": landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased morbidity, loss of access to common property resources, and social disarticulation (Cernea 2000, 19). He further asserted that the probability of these risks producing serious consequences is extremely high in badly planned resettlement.

Cernea noted that "While some degree of population territorial rearrangement is unavoidable, such inequitable distribution of benefits and losses is neither mandatory nor inevitable . . . socially responsible resettlement

... can prevent impoverishment and can generate benefits for the regional economy and host populations" (Cernea 1996). Basically he argued that development should avoid displacement where at all possible, but where projects are determined to be necessary, the risks of negative effects can be reduced by political commitment, appropriate legal protection, and adequate resource allocations. His IRR model is designed to predict, diagnose, and resolve the problems associated with DIDR. He also maintained that the hardship of resettlement may be less responsible for resistance than the fact that policy and legal vacuums leave people little alternative (1996, 258).

Dwivedi's research on the Narmada Dam complex in western India has significantly contributed several refinements to the risk approach by elaborating on the social and political construction of risk. Drawing on Beck (1992), he approached risk as "a subjective calculation of different groups of people embedded differentially in political-economic and environmental conditions" (Dwivedi 1999, 47). People in different structural positions define risk differently, but their risk calculations are also affected by cultural norms as well as legal and policy frameworks for compensation (Beck 1995, 43). Risk is calculated on the basis of information that allows people to make judgments about relative degrees of certainty or uncertainty of outcomes. People facing DIDR very often spend a considerable amount of time under conditions of uncertainty, in which a lack of information about what is going to happen seriously hampers their ability to assess conditions and act, compounding their disorientation and trauma. Uncertainty and the lack of predictability heighten the perception of risk because, without adequate information, no calculations of losses and benefits are possible (Dwivedi 1999, 47). Most mandated resettlement projects deprive people of control over fundamental features of their lives and have generally been derelict in providing affected populations with the kinds of information necessary to reassert satisfactory control and understanding over the resettlement process or the changed circumstances of their lives. Understanding of and control over circumstances are fundamental for human beings to deal productively and positively with the forces of change. Therefore, if people find that their understanding and control are diminished, change will be characterized by conflict, tension, and, perhaps, active resistance. The often extremely negative concrete impacts of resettlement projects on affected peoples compound the disorientation generated by the loss of control and understanding as motivations for resistance. Resistance is a reassertion of both a logic and a sense of control (Oliver-Smith 1996; Turner 1991). The resistance to the Sardar Sarovar Dam of the Narmada River in western India offers a case in point.

The Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) is but one part of the Narmada Valley Project (NVP) which includes the construction of ten major dams on the Narmada and 20 others on its tributaries (Baviskar 1992, 233). The Sardar Sarovar dam is projected to provide irrigation water for 1.8 million hectares of land. The dam is also intended to provide drinking water for 4,720 villages and 131 towns, while generating 1,450 MW of electricity. The damming of the Narmada will submerge roughly 37,000 hectares of land and displace an estimated 163,500 people (Parasuraman 1999, 179; Fisher 1995, 13). The estimates of benefits to be generated and costs to be incurred by construction of the dam are hotly contested by a variety of people representing many interests. Economic costs are criticized for being grossly underestimated. The human and environmental costs are said to be based on low estimates of the number of people to be affected and a lack of understanding of the cultural disruption that the tribal people in particular will suffer in dislocation. The alleged benefits in the form of irrigation and drinking water are also said to be vastly unrealistic (Fisher 1995, 17). Critics also argue that there were no provisions for appropriately informing the people to be affected, much less any remotely adequate plans for their humane and constructive resettlement.

Like many of India's tribal groups, the people of the Narmada Valley have a tradition of resistance to any attempts by outsiders to compromise their autonomy and their resource base (Parasuraman 1999, 232). Although protest against the dam began appearing earlier, active resistance began to evolve in 1980, when two voluntary organizations started working with the people to improve resettlement conditions and to help in legal actions related to land. A second stage of resistance developed in 1987 after the Indian government displaced roughly 2,000 families. The government neither informed nor consulted the affected people because it believed that the tribal peoples would not understand the issues even if they had the information (1999, 237). In 1985 Medha Patkar, a social scientist and activist, began organizing in the project-affected villages of Maharashtra. She and other activists framed the issues in development terms based on the absolute lack of basic services that the villages suffered. They organized village committees, instituted adult education programs, and established health care programs. They provided information about the dam to the villages, including submergence levels, the numbers of people who would face dislocation, the resettlement and rehabilitation programs, and other issues (1999, 238). The villages themselves began to collect comprehensive household data on potential losses to inform the government so that adequate compensation levels could be set. Furthermore, they demanded that the government provide the right to information on all aspects of the dam, more comprehensive

land surveys for adequate compensation, a comprehensive resettlement plan, the right to resettle within their own state, and the extension of resettlement and rehabilitation benefits to all those affected by the subsidiary projects of the dam such as the colony, canal, sanctuary, and compensatory afforestation programs (1999, 239).

By the late 1980s it was clear that the government of India and the state governments were not willing to establish a coherent policy for compensation for a variety of losses to be incurred by the people, leading to the evolution of a position of total opposition to the SSP (Parasuraman 1999, 240–41). The local organizations united and formed the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA), or “Save the Narmada Movement,” under the leadership of Mehda Patkar. Their opposition was voiced in the slogan *Koi nahin hatega! Baandh nahin banega!*—“No one will move! The dam will not be built!” (Baviskar 1992, 238). The NBA initiated a campaign of resistance on a broad front. In addition to efforts to mobilize the villages in the valley, the NBA established linkages with NGOs and social movements in both rural and urban areas in India as well as with international NGOs that pressured the international financial community to withdraw economic support from the project. In 1989 the Environmental Defense Fund, the Environmental Policy Institute, and the National Wildlife Federation urged the U.S. Congress to pressure the World Bank to undertake an independent review of the project, which turned out to be highly critical (Morse and Berger 1992). The NBA also brought suit in state courts against the SSP, charging improper land acquisition and forcible eviction, state repression, and denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to life (Baviskar 1992, 239–40). The NBA also sued the project in the Supreme Court in 1994, which, although it was defeated, led the NBA to renew efforts at resistance, including groups of people willing to drown themselves in the waters rising behind the partially completed dam in villages below the expected submergence lines.

The NBA has gained the support of celebrities, including rock stars, prize-winning authors, and supreme court justices, and it has also won a number of international environmental awards. With its increasing international fame, tensions between the local priorities of people in the valley and the broader agenda of the NBA have appeared. Some NGOs have criticized the NBA for making decisions without consulting the people in the valley (Patel and Mehta 1995, 404). Some local people have felt that the NBA has exploited them, urging them to resist rather than accept resettlement in order for the NBA to gain political capital in their struggle against the dam (Dwivedi 1998, 167). Nonetheless, the NBA appears to have the support of most of the people in the valley, and it has continued its opposition in the form of meetings, marches, demonstrations, petitions, strikes, public con-

frontations with authorities, roadblocks, hunger strikes, refusals to move, and “save or drown squads.” The NBA has adopted Gandhian resistance strategies, including the *satyagraha*, a nonviolent mass social action event. They have also acquired a voluntary support group, Friends of River Narmada, which provides a sophisticated Web site chronicling the history of the movement and up-to-date information on the struggle, as well as information on opportunities to contribute resources and participate. There is also a Narmada Solidarity Network, composed of six organizations from various cities in the United States.

Mediating institutions, such as NGOs and independent commissions, also frame and may politicize uncertainties and risks, and they may be pivotal in the way people construct risk as well. The World Commission on Dams (WCD) links risk with the concept of rights by advocating that an “approach based on ‘recognition of rights’ and ‘assessment of risks’ (particularly rights at risk)” be elaborated to guide future planning and decisionmaking on dams (2000, 2006). The global review of the WCD stressed the need to address the five values of equity, efficiency, participatory decisionmaking, sustainability, and accountability as justification for the elaboration of a rights-and-risks approach to dam construction. Rights that were seen to be relevant in large dam projects included constitutional rights, customary rights, legislated rights, and property rights (of both landholders and developers and investors). These rights can be grouped by their legal status, their spatial or temporal reach, or their purpose. In the case of spatial or temporal dimensions, rights of local, regional, or national entities or the rights of present or future generations can be perceived. In terms of purpose, rights are cited that pertain to material resources such as land, water, forests, and pasture or to spiritual, moral, or cultural resources such as religion, dignity, and identity (2000, 2006).

Most recently, Chris de Wet has sought to incorporate Cernea’s important insights into a more comprehensive approach (de Wet, forthcoming). Asking why resettlement so often goes wrong, de Wet sees two broad approaches to responding to the question. The first approach is what he calls the inadequate inputs approach, which argues that resettlement projects fail because of a lack of appropriate inputs: national legal frameworks and policies, political will, funding, predisplacement research, careful implementation, and monitoring. Optimistic in tenor, the inadequate inputs approach posits that the risks and injuries of resettlement can be controlled and mitigated by appropriate policies and practices. De Wet, on the other hand, finds himself moving toward what he calls the inherent complexity approach. He argues that there is a complexity in resettlement that is inherent in “the interrelatedness of a range of factors of different orders: cultural,

social, environmental, economic, institutional and political—all of which are taking place in the context of imposed space change and of local level responses and initiatives” (de Wet, forthcoming). Moreover, these changes are taking place simultaneously in an interlinked and mutually influencing process of transformation. And further, these internal changes from the displacement process are also influenced by and respond to the imposition of external sources of power as well as the initiatives of local actors. Therefore, the resettlement process emerges out of the complex interaction of all these factors in ways that are not predictable and that do not seem amenable to a rational planning approach.

De Wet suggests that a more comprehensive and open-ended approach than the predominantly economic and operational inadequate inputs approach is necessary to understand, adapt to, and take advantage of the opportunities presented by the inherent complexity of the displacement and resettlement process. Although some might see this perspective as unduly pessimistic, the fact that authorities are limited in the degree of control they can exercise over a project creates a space for resettlers to take greater control over the process. The challenge thus becomes the development of policy that supports a genuine participatory and open-ended approach to resettlement planning and decisionmaking (de Wet, forthcoming).

## **Applied Anthropological Frameworks for Analysis and Action**

The three perspectives proposed for applied anthropological frameworks for analysis and action are advocacy anthropology, stakeholder analysis, and political ecology ethnography, and an approach adapted from Little’s analysis of environmental conflicts in Amazonia (1999). The advocacy anthropology approach is characterized by an activist stance that privileges a particular group’s perspective over competing or contesting positions. This approach has been shown to be particularly valuable in situations where groups, such as the Native Americans of Amazonia, may be facing acute sociopolitical forces that may amount to ethnocide, to which DIDR has been likened (Barabas and Bartolome 1973), or even genocide. Little suggests that one limitation of an advocacy approach is that only one point of view, of the many that may be relevant in resettlement issues, is presented, eclipsing the possibility of presenting the view that each contesting social actor may have its own sources of legitimacy. Thus, advocacy anthropology may forfeit the analysis of positions taken, for example, by anthropologists within the World Bank on behalf of peoples affected by DIDR. Conversely, it can equally be argued that advocacy anthropology often articulates a view that otherwise might not be heard, thus promoting dialogue and negotiation.



Stakeholder analysis is an approach to environmental conflict that has emerged recently to resolve conflicts and thereby reduce levels of environmentally destructive activities and processes. Stakeholder analysis employs methods of conciliation, negotiation, and mediation for reducing levels of conflict and managing disputes. Such efforts at establishing truly effective methods for cross-cultural negotiation in DIDR can play meaningful roles in enhancing the capacity of local peoples to effectively represent their interests. On the other hand, one criticism of stakeholder analysis is that it frequently assumes that all actors have equal or symmetrical stakes in the conflict, something that is rarely the case. For example, although monetary values of the loss of home, land, and community may allegedly be compensated at levels established by the project, it is not often that they adequately reflect the true nature of the project in terms of the social, spiritual, and emotional losses that are at stake for people facing DIDR. Moreover, stakeholder approaches also assume that all participants in the disputes hold citizenship and have the abilities to employ their rights within the larger political space of the nation. Again, assumptions of this sort are far from warranted, especially in cases involving ethnic minorities or indigenous peoples, whose positions in national social and cultural hierarchies generally eliminate the exercise of such basic rights (Little 1999). In the view of Laura Nader, the “neutral” position of stakeholder approaches is largely fictional in that it is ideologically based on a kind of functionalist harmonics that is less about the representation and interplay of diverse interests than it is about pacification and hegemonic control (Nader 1996, as quoted in Little 1999).

Political ecology ethnography is characterized by methods that aim to generate a social scientific approach that incorporates multiple perspectives. This goal is achieved by methods and tools—aimed at inclusion of multiple groups at multiple levels—to explore not only the political dimensions of these conflicts but also to bring new participants into the political frame of action and to initiate new approaches to viewing power relationships across multiple social and natural scales (Little 1999, 4). Importantly, this approach has the potential of creating concepts that may be adopted by the new participants to question established public policy and generate new alternatives for action. The methods that are employed in this approach focus on identification of all the different participants in the conflicts, a task that can be challenging in light of their numbers and the diverse historical and cultural traditions that have helped to situate them in the dispute. Most essentially, the task must reveal the basic claims to resources and territory that are made by participant social actors, and it must analyze the forms by which such claims are promoted and defended

within broader political spheres of action in ways that display the competing discourses of cultural and political legitimacy (1999, 5). In this fashion the disputes over eligibility for DIDR compensation may hinge on the legitimacy of various kinds of claims to land.

All three of these perspectives have significant advantages and disadvantages in approaching DIDR. In point of fact, unlike Little, I tend to see them as nested, interacting, and complementary rather than as exclusive. Each approach roughly corresponds to a level of action in resettlement politics. As in all research conceptual frameworks and methodologies, there are moments and places of inconsistency or less-than-perfect fit, even contradiction. In that sense, the methodological approaches reflect the tensions and inconsistencies of relations within and among the various levels of resettlement politics. Advocacy research, stakeholder analysis, and political ecology ethnography, focusing on the rights and risks in DIDR, correspond to the levels or scales of interaction. Advocacy anthropology is appropriate for work at the level of the community to be resettled. In some instances, applied social scientists have found themselves carrying out research in the midst of the crisis of resettlement while people are facing a virtually life-threatening process (Colson 1971; Oliver-Smith 1986). In these contexts, researchers adopting an advocacy stance fulfill a necessary function in assisting communities in their efforts to deal with the crisis and in articulating their views in nonlocal contexts. Similarly, when DIDR projects are underway and communities are involved in bargaining or negotiating the terms and conditions of resettlement with planners and other authorities, stakeholder analysis can prove useful both in assisting people in the negotiation process and in demarcating the issues and limits that are "in play" in the process. Enlightened stakeholder analysis can reveal the differentials in value positions that are being negotiated among very disparate participants. Stakeholder analysis that is culturally sensitive can frame the issues in ways that help to balance those situations where, as one historian put it, one party has "a continent to exchange and the other, glass beads."

Finally, a political ecology ethnography helps to place DIDR in the context of global conversations about development. The political ecological perspective reveals the commonalities that specific communities, which are engaged with specific projects in diverse regions, contribute to the emergence of new forms of discourse in the shaping of alternative approaches to development that are less destructive to environments and human rights. By revealing the interplay of multiple interests across scales and levels, political ecology ethnography informs both the policy and practice to the communities and the affected peoples of the dimensions, scale, and implications of their roles, not only in specific projects but also in

larger conversations, calling for more sustainable forms of development around the world.

## Conclusion

The total environment of development planning and funding is rapidly changing, particularly issues at the core of DIDR that impact social and environmental justice advocacy. The role of applied anthropology as both participant and observer in the evolving nature of the local-global politics of social and environmental advocacy needs to be critically assessed, building on the substantial work already done, to develop new understandings and approaches to the challenges of DIDR. For example, DIDR-affected peoples are developing novel strategies in defense of their rights in their relations with the state and the global capital market by invoking international human rights covenants. Political power is emerging in supranational organizations, NGOs, and private institutions to expand the claims for disempowered subjects under the law (Clark, Fox, and Treacle 2003). Project-affected communities provide a point of convergence for the human rights and environmental movements to create an arena for an expanded international civil society across borders (Fisher 1995). This convergence entails a critique of development models that accept the necessity of relocating people, but also a questioning of the scale of development interventions that create major disruption for people, their ways of life, and their environments. Further, this discourse also reassesses the extent of state sovereignty and invokes changes in global political culture.

There is currently an active debate among powerful interests on the role of dams and other large infrastructural projects. Renewed efforts by national governments and private interests to promote development projects with DIDR components but without significant legal and economic protection are threatening increasing numbers of people and communities. Despite widespread criticism, the actual practice of development continues to favor large infrastructural expansion and economic growth over ecological and cultural concerns (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, and Rothengatter 2003; Josephson 2002). For example, the recent reframing of dams by the World Bank, nation-states, and industry associations as environmentally benign, socially productive, and efficient technologies reflects an energized perspective favoring “high risk, high reward” projects. India’s enormous river-linking scheme, for example, defies every major recommendation of the World Commission on Dams. The recent weakening of World Bank guidelines regarding both involuntary resettlement and the protection of indigenous people affected by development projects has also alarmed the activist community (Downing

and Moles 2001). Further, the lack of clarity about the responsibilities of privately funded development projects to affected peoples is cause for concern.

However, these trends have been met by such initiatives as the World Commission on Dams (2000), the Extractive Industries Review (2003), and the Equator Principles (2003), which are aimed at creating what Jonathan Fox has called "accountability politics" to ensure socially and environmentally responsible development (Fox 2003, xii). The World Bank Inspection Panel, which allows people affected by bank-funded projects to file complaints and request independent investigations regarding a bank's compliance with its own social and environmental guidelines, is another element in the quest for accountability, although its results since its creation in 1993 have been uneven (Clark, Fox, and Treakle 2003). Furthermore, gaining prior informed consent from people to be affected by projects (Goodland 2004) and strengthening the legal basis and procedures for payment of reparations for injuries and costs imposed on individuals and communities by projects have recently emerged as strategic priorities (Johnston 2000). It is fair to say that an opportunity now exists for applied anthropology to make further contributions to the development of socially and environmentally responsible DIDR policy and practice in the future.

As the debates on development evolve in the twenty-first century, the concerns for continued infrastructural and economic growth will continue to be countered by concerns for more environmentally sustainable and more democratic forms of development, particularly at the local level. Development projects have increasingly become the sites in which these interests and issues are contested and played out through different models of development by individuals and groups from a variety of communities, both local and nonlocal. To some extent, both sides of the discussion share similar rhetorics of social justice and material well being, but they differ markedly on the deeper philosophical meaning of development as a social goal and the means by which that goal should be achieved. The meanings, means, and implications of development in the discussion reflect the internal heterogeneity of both the development industry and those who propose alternative visions (Fisher 1995, 8).

Reigning development models, promoting large-scale infrastructural projects, transform social and physical environments and espouse the concept of "the greatest good for the greatest number" while attempting to safeguard local rights and well-being. Although generally the record has yet to reflect it, such a position assumes that the less powerful will eventually benefit from the project through well-designed and implemented resettlement programs. For some, within the framework of current economic structures

and conditions, realism dictates acceptance of this development ideology. The opposing view tends to emphasize the rights of the less powerful and the significance of cultural and environmental diversity over projects it considers to be ecologically risky and economically questionable. The fact that applied anthropologists of good faith have employed their knowledge, analytical skills, and energies on both sides of the debate testifies to the complexity and the urgency of the issues.

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